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The role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War is a hotly con-
tested issue among historians and political scientists. Various 
propositions have been advanced: nuclear weapons were a 
necessary, if not sufficient condition for the long peace between 
the superpowers after the end of World War 11; 1 they were 
essentially irrelevant to that peace;2 they may possibly have 
contributed to the peace, but not without heavy costs and risks 
that might as well have led to a nuclear disaster;' or, as the 
intellectually least ambitious thesis, the question is intrinsically 
impossible to answer and should therefore be dismissed as a 
pseudo-problem.' 
The aim of this study is neither to assess the explanatory power 
of these propositions, nor to offer any alternative thesis. Rather, 
I will examine a related but less complex historical problem: 
What characterized the nuclear weapons policy of the United 
States during the Cold War? How did that policy evolve over 
the years, and what factors were most influential in bringing 
about the changes that can be observed? 
To answer these general questions, we need first to deal with 
several more specific problems. One has to do with terminology. 
Since "nuclear policy" is not a very precise tenn, we should 
define more exactly what aspect of it we are dealing with at any 
particular point of analysis. In the Cold War era, an important 
distinction existed between, on the one hand, US plans and 
preparations for the possible use of nuclear forces in a war with 
the Soviet Union (US nuclear strategy), and, on the other hand, 
the various means by which US authorities tried either to 
minimize Soviet offensive capabilities (US strategic arms 
control policy) or to maximize American protection against a 
Soviet nuclear attack (passive or active means of strategic 
defense). One important aim of this study is to analyze the 
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interplay between these different aspects of US nuclear policy, 
with particular emphasis on how changes in nuclear strategy 
may explain the changing roles of strategic arms control and 
strategic defense in this forty-five year period. 
What complicates our task is that "strategy" itself is such an 
ambiguous term. For the purpose of this study, I will distinguish 
between four different segments, or levels, of US nuclear 
strategy, which might be more or less coordinated and consistent 
with each other. The first level is usually referred to as 
declaratory policy: authoritative statements describing the 
official guiding principles, or "doctrines", for the deployment 
and possible use of US strategic forces in war. Whereas such 
statements may have had important political-military functions 
of their own, their ability to deter Soviet aggression was widely 
seen as a function of how Moscow perceived the will and 
capability of the US government to carry out its nuclear 
doctrine. If that assumption holds true - and it would be 
extremely difficult even in retrospect to falsify it - it follows 
that the declaratory statements of US policymakers should never 
be analyzed in isolation (a rule, by the way, commonly dis-
missed in the academic literature on nuclear strategy). At least 
three other segments of nuclear policy will often prove of 
relevance to the analysis: acquisition policy, employment policy, 
and deployment policy. The first refers to the planning criteria 
used by decisionmakers for developing and procuring nuclear 
weapon systems for the future. The second refers to how 
available weapons are targeted and planned for use in the event 
of nuclear conflict. The third refers to how nuclear forces are 
actually deployed and postured.' 
In the following, I will deal with each of these policy aspects 
and strategy segments. Thus, the first part of this study focuses 
on the evolution of US strategic doctrine, discussing whether the 
changes registered were paralleled by a similar evolution in 
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acquisition, employment, and deployment (AED) policies. In the 
second part, the focus shifts to the evolutionary interplay 
between strategic arms control and strategic defense, both of 
which will be analyzed also in light of the developments 
discussed in part one. 
Throughout, two general pairs of questions are raised: How did 
US nuclear policy change over the years, and what factors may 
help to explain these changes? To what extent did the registered 
changes in doctrine, AED priorities, strategic arms control 
positions, and strategic defense programs reflect different 
strategic-political goals; and, conversely, to what extent did 
there exist - beneath the ever-changing ripples on the surface -
a steady undercurrent of tasks and objectives that remained 
essentially unchanged throughout the Cold War period? 
In the concluding third part of this study, I offer some tentative 
answers to these questions, and also formulate some general 
propositions about US nuclear policy in the Cold War era. The 
overall conclusion is that the principal goals of that policy - to 
deter war if possible, to ensure victory in war if necessary -
remained remarkably stable throughout the period. On the other 
hand, there was no comparable consensus about policy means. 
US decisionmakers vacillated between two very different 
schemes for obtaining their strategic goals. One school of 
thought believed that, given the hostile and expansionist nature 
of the Soviet system, war could be deterred only if the United 
States maintained a clear edge in the strategic arms race. 
Opposed to these advocates of US superiority was a group of 
arms control experts, civilian nuclear strategists, and politicians 
who argued that, as a result of the Soviet Union's increasing 
offensive capabilities and the practical impossibility of strategic 
defense, peace and stability could be obtained only through 
measures that made both parties equally vulnerable to each 
other's offensive forces. Whereas the superiority school 
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dominated US policymaking in the 1950s and early 1960s, the 
parity (or MAD) school gained predominance in the wake of the 
Cuban missile crisis, thereafter holding its grip on US nuclear 
policymaking for about a decade. By the mid-!970s, however, 
the pendulum had once again begun to swing in the opposite 
direction. The result was that, during the Ford, Carter, Reagan, 
and Bush Administrations, the superiority school gradually 
succeeded in regaining influence. 
Given the dramatic changes that had taken place in the stmtegic 
environment between the early 1950s and the mid-1970s, such 
a comeback calls for an explanation. Did it result from "domes-
tic political pressures", "bureaucratic politics" or "technological 
momentum" - general factors often used in explaining the 
strategic arms race'' - or should it rather be seen as a rational 
response to what US policymakers now perceived as an m-
creasing military threat from the Soviet Union? 
While these questions cannot be fully addressed before more 
archives have been made available for historical research, some 
tentative answers can still be offered on the basis of current 
knowledge. At the end of the present study, I suggest that the 
revival of the superiority school was due to three overriding 
factors: a general conservative upswing in American society 
from the m id-1970s onwards; an increasing sense of insecurity 
because of real or anticipated changes in the strategic 
capabilities and nuclear doctrine of the Soviet Union; and 
significant technological developments in strategic defense and 
so-called C3 facilities (command, control and communication 
networks). Far more than bureaucratic politics or technological 
break-throughs in offensive strategic weapons systems, these 
three factors precipitated the balance of argument in favor of the 
superiority school. The result is well known: precisely at the 
time when the Soviet leadership was beginning to realize that 
the strategic arms race was over-burdening its national economy, 
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US defense and security policies took a dramatic turn towards 
costly modernization and R&D programs, especially in the 
technologically sophisticated area of strategic defense. 
While it is hard to estimate what causal impact these develop-
ments might have had on the process that led to the fall of the 
Soviet Union and the peaceful ending of the Cold War, it seems 
unlikely that this renewed US quest for strategic superiority did 
not at least contribute to the speed at which that historical 
process was brought to its unexpected but logical conclusion. 
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The evolution of US nuclear strategy 
What strategic-political functions did nuclear weapons have in 
US Cold War policy towards the Soviet Union? What objectives 
were they to help to obtain in peacetime, and what would be 
their tasks in war? 
As US policymakers first began to consider the political and 
military implications of the atomic bomb, they gradually came 
to emphasize three fundamental tasks for the embryologic 
nuclear forces of the United States. First and foremost, the 
atomic bomb was seen as their most important instrument for 
deterring Soviet aggression against the United States or its 
allies7 Secondly, the bomb was increasingly considered a 
"tremendous advance" in war-fighting capability; thus, should 
deterrence fail and major war break out, nuclear weapons were 
to ensure a favorable outcome for the United States.' Thirdly, 
US policymakers were concerned that other Western societies, 
especially in Europe, could be intimidated by Moscow and 
brought to make self-defeating concessions if a majority of their 
populations should come to feel that the overall balance of 
power was changing in favor of the Soviets. Within this 
psychological-political context, nuclear weapons were intended 
to bolster Westem morale, thereby offsetting the negative impact 
of Soviet superiority in other areas of defense, particularly m 
conventional forces for the central front in Europe.' 
We shall now see how, within a rapidly changing strategic 
environment, these broad political-military objectives were 
extrapolated into specific plans and policies for how US nuclear 
forces most efficiently could serve US interests. 
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The atomic blitz: US nuclear strategy m embryonic 
form (1948-1952) 
Even though these three broad objectives - deterring Soviet 
aggression, securing US victory in war, and bolstering Western 
morale - were all formulated and generally agreed upon by US 
policymakers as early as 1946-1947, it took more than three 
years from the first atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki before the Truman Administration was to develop 
anything resembling a nuclear strategy. In September 1948, the 
National Security Council approved NSC-30, a top-secret 
memorandum entitled "United States Policy on Atomic War-
fare". This document was prepared in response to growing 
frustrations among military planners and foreign-policymakers 
over the lack of policy guidelines, operational plans, and 
practical military preparations for the possible employment of 
nuclear forces in a conflict with the Soviet Union. 
To the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Secretary of Defense, 
James V. Forrestal, the Berlin crisis had revealed how utterly 
unprepared the United States was to make political and military 
use of its nuclear monopoly. Shaken by that experience, the 
Pentagon asked for a presidential decision on the US position 
regarding the initiation of atomic warfare, including con-
sideration of the time and circumstances of employment, and the 
type of targets against which nuclear weapons would be 
employed. 10 The request resulted in NSC-30, which placed two 
recommendations before the President. First of all, it re-
commended that, in the event of war, the National Military 
Establishment should be ready to "utilize promptly and 
effectively all appropriate means available, including atomic 
weapons, in the interest of national security and must therefore 
plan accordingly". In additon, it suggested that the decision 
whether to employ atomic weapons in any future war was "to be 
made by the Chief Executive when he considers such a decision 
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to be required", and that no official advance declaration should 
be made regarding the President's likely decision on the 
matter. 1 1 
In accordance with these recommendations, official US policy 
under Truman became one of "possible first-use" of nuclear 
weapons in response to a major conventional or nuclear attack 
by the Soviet Union and its allies. The scale of such Soviet 
provocation was never specified: in principle, any direct threat 
against vital US interests could prompt a presidential decision to 
use nuclear weapons. Nor did NSC-30 say anything about the 
likely sequence of US actions preceding such a decision; for 
instance, whether all available conventional options would be 
executed first or, at the other extreme, the entire strategic 
nuclear force would be used in a single devastating first 
response to a Soviet conventional attack. In subsequent official 
statements, Truman and his senior advisers held on to this 
flexible position, apparently hoping to deter Soviet aggression 
simply by stressing the possibility of a US nuclear response to 
any major military operations against the West. 
Similar flexibility was adopted with regard to acqUISitiOn, 
employment, and deployment policies as well. On the one hand, 
Truman had told a group of military and foreign policy advisers 
that, even though he prayed that he never would have to order 
the use of nuclear weapons, no one should doubt that he would 
do so, if the situation made it necessary." Moreover, there is 
no indications that he would allow political or moral con-
siderations to decide the choice of targets for the strategic 
bomber offensive." On the other hand, he refused to give his 
military planners access to information on the precise size of the 
US nuclear forces - which made several strategic war plans 
totally unrealistic because they targeted far more Soviet indus-
trial and military installations than there were bombs in the US 
stockpile. 
12 
Until the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, Truman 
also insisted on a deployment policy which put severe re-
strictions on the operational readiness of the Strategic Air 
Command (SAC), the principal executor of the planned "atomic 
blitz" strike against the Soviet Union. All nuclear weapons were 
kept under strict civilian custody of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC), which would start to assemble and transfer them 
to the SAC bases only upon direct order from the President. 
Indeed, prior to July 1952, not even the non-nuclear components 
of the AEC-controlled atomic bombs were allowed to be stored 
outside the territory of the United States. This meant that, in an 
emergency, all weapons parts would have to be transported to 
SAC's forward bases and assembled there before becoming 
operational.'" 
These restrictions did not mean that there had been no practical 
preparations at all for a possible military use of the nuclear 
stockpile. Following the approval of NSC-30, the Adminis-
tration's AED policies underwent several important develop-
ments, with the aggregated effect that by the end of Truman's 
term in early 1953, the United States had dramatically enhanced 
both its nuclear capabilities and its strategic-political dependence 
on nuclear forces. First of all, the stockpile had increased more 
than ten-fold, from approximately 100 atomic bombs by the end 
of 1948 to over I ,000 by the end of 1952." Equally important, 
the qualitative characteristics of the bombs had been radically 
upgraded and refined. Whereas the 1948 stockpile had consisted 
exclusively of Mk.3 fission bombs, a clumsy 15-22 kiloton 
gadget which took a 39-man crew over two days to assemble 
and could be delivered only by huge strategic bombers (the B-
29s, B-36s, and B-50s), the I 952 stockpile contained both a 200 
kt yield bomb for strategic usage (Mk.6), a deep penetration 
bomb of similar yield designed for hardened targets (Mk.8), two 
smaller bomb types for tactical missions (Mk.5 and Mk.7), and 
a 15 kt artillery shell (Mk.9). In addition, the Atomic Energy 
13 
Commission had developed and successfully tested a thenno-
nuclear device. A year later, this would lead to the introduction 
of the first H-bomb in the US stockpile: the Mk.l8 with the 
horrifying yield of 15,000 kt. As for delivery, nuclear weapons 
could now be brought on target by anything from the 280mm 
horowitzer, assigned for the European "tactical" battlefield, to a 
wide range of aircraft, including the tactical F-846 "Thunderjet" 
and the B-4 7 "Stratojet" bomber." 
Reflecting this growth and sophistication of capabilities, nuclear 
weapons were assigned increasingly demanding tasks in US war 
plans. The first tentative plans for a nuclear strike against the 
Soviet Union, such as the Pincher/Broi/erplans of 1946-47, had 
restricted SAC's operational responsibility to the task of 
delivering a massive nuclear air strike against some 20-odd 
Soviet cities and urban centers. The principal objective was to 
paralyze the enemy's will, prompting an early surrender. From 
1949 onwards, however, US war planners gradually began to 
expand SAC's role to include the execution of three different 
tasks or missions, presented here in order of priority: 
-the Bravo mission, which called for the blunt elimination 
of Soviet offensive forces capable of delivering nuclear 
weapons against Western targets; 
- the Delta mission, aimed at an increasingly wide range 
of industrial targets judged crucial to Soviet war-making 
capability; 
- the Romeo mission, which essentially consisted of 
employing a number of lower-yield nuclear weapons 
against tactical targets, basically large ground and artillery 
forces on the move toward Western Europe." 
This expansion of operational tasks had several causes. The 
Bravo mission was added to the list in response to the successful 
Soviet nuclear test in September 1949, which implied that the 
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United States would now have to face the possibility of be-
coming a target for nuclear attack. The Romeo mission was 
added partly in response to technological developments - the 
introduction of small lower-yield tactical nuclear weapons -
partly because of increasing US concern about Soviet con-
ventional superiority after the formation of NATO, and partly 
because of inter-service rivalry." 
By the time the Truman Administration was wound up after the 
1952 presidential election, the National Military Establishment 
of the United States had become a very different creature than 
at its establishment in 1947. In fiscal 1952, the defense and 
atomic energy budgets allocated funds to nuclear forces 
equivalent to 3% of the GNP - a share never to be exceeded 
during the Cold War." Having ordered a substantial increase 
in US production of weapon-grade uranium and plutonium in 
the fall of 1949, the president approved another dramatic 
production increase in October 1950, one week after he had 
formally approved the important national security policy 
document NSC-68 20 A third increase in fissionable production 
was ordered in January 1952, calling for a 50% increase in 
plutonium production and I 50% in uranium 235.21 
Equally important was the expansion in the political-strategic 
function of the nuclear forces. Whereas in 194 7 US war 
planners were still debating the actual utility of nuclear 
weapons, both NSC-68 and the emergency war plans prepared 
in 1950-52 were based on the assumption that whatever 
conventional build-up the United States might undertake in the 
near future, clear "preeminence" in strategic and tactical nuclear 
was a necessary precondition for the fulfillment of America's 
peace- and wartime objectives toward the Soviet Union. 22 
From these and other documents, it is clear that the US nuclear 
forces were meant to achieve four distinct objectives: First of 
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all, they should help to deter Soviet aggression against the 
United States and its allies." Secondly, they were intended to 
bolster Western self-confidence in a situation of alleged 
conventional inferiority." Thirdly, in case of war, an early and 
massive employment of nuclear weapons against Soviet strategic 
targets was to force the enemy to a quick surrender. Should the 
initial Bravo first strike not weaken the Soviet Union's war-
fighting capabilities sufficiently to paralyze Soviet will, the 
United States would then employ nuclear weapons in their 
Romeo and Delta modes - with the respective purposes of 
halting the expected Soviet ground offensive in Central Europe 25 
- and crippling the Soviet Union's war-making capability 
through massive destruction of her economic infrastructure, 
energy production facilities, and government centers." 
In order to achieve the two latter objectives, the United States 
would not hesitate to be the first to use nuclear weapons, 
whether for tactical purposes in Europe or for strategic purposes 
in an all-out war. On the other hand, however, Truman was 
never willing to speciry the exact circumstances under which he 
would be ready to order a nuclear attack. The general im-
pression, though, was that the nuclear option was reserved 
exclusively for the event of a massive Soviet assault against the 
United States or its major European or Asian allies. 
Massive retaliation (1953-1960) 
The first major shift in US nuclear strategy came in early 1954, 
when John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's Secretary of 
State, publicly announced that, in any future conflict with 
Communist countries, the United States would "depend primarily 
upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at 
places of our own choosing"." Even if Dulles did not refer 
specifically to nuclear weapons, the message was unmistakable: 
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the likely US response to any future enemy attack - be it small 
or large, conventional or nuclear, directed against the United 
States itself, its allies, or its overseas bases- would be to launch 
a devastating nuclear attack on Soviet and Chinese military 
installations, industrial plants and cities." 
This doctrine of massive retaliation differed from the position 
of the Truman Administration in two important ways. First of 
all, it signaled that the United States no longer saw the atomic 
bomb as a weapon of last resort, to be used only in such life-
and-death-struggles as following a Soviet nuclear first strike 
against the United States or a massive conventional attack 
against its principal European and Asian allies. In a sense, the 
new doctrine put less emphasis on the magnitude of the Soviet 
aggression and more on its overall strategic context: if Washing-
ton judged that US security interests were threatened, even a 
very limited enemy assault could prompt a massive response. In 
order to enhance the credibility of this strategy, Eisenhower and 
Dulles took great pains to convince the Soviet leadership that 
they saw nuclear weapons as an ordinary military, rather than 
extraordinary political instrument of power. For instance, 
Eisenhower used many of his early press conferences and 
interviews to point out that he, in implicit contrast to Truman, 
would employ nuclear weapons against tactical or strategic 
targets whenever operational circumstances favored their use. 
Even if no one used exactly those words at the time, this 
implied a willingness to lower the nuclear threshold." Indeed, 
when Dulles and Eisenhower made their doctrinal announce-
ments in January 1954, they had already directed changes in US 
war plans that would make the United States more committed to 
an early use of nuclear weapons across a wide range of possible 
military conflicts.30 
Secondly, the doctrine of massive retaliation also tried to install 
greater uncertainty about the precise timing and direction of the 
17 
US nuclear re.1ponse. The Truman Administration had given the 
impression that, before even considering to trespass the nuclear 
threshold, it would exhaust a number of conventional options. 
Moreover, in case of a strictly limited and localized war- say, 
in Korea, Iran, or on NATO's southern tlank -there was reason 
to expect a possible US nuclear response to be confined to the 
point of the original aggression~ that is, to targets within or near 
the theater in which the Communist attack had taken place. As 
pointed out by American diplomatic historian John Lewis 
Gaddis, one of the major objectives of massive retaliation was 
to undermine whatever assumptions the Soviet leaders might 
have had about symmetry between their own aggressive acts and 
the subsequent American responses. Instead, Eisenhower and 
Dulles intended their new doctrine to make it more difficult for 
the Soviets to discount the risk of major war - conventional or 
nuclear- even in minor military incidents. 31 
The doctrine of massive retaliation was fully consistent with the 
general thrust of Eisenhower's defense policy. Labeled the "New 
Look", that policy was based on two major assumptions: First, 
despite recent US-European efforts to increase NATO's 
capabilities, the conventional military balance in Europe 
remained unfavorable to the West, and could be rectified only 
at excessive economic cost. Secondly, Eisenhower and his 
advisers believed that there existed a limit for how much a 
liberal capitalist society could spend on defense without tatally 
impairing its economic base, and that the United States had 
come dangerously close to that limit during the final two years 
of the Truman Administration. On the basis of these premises, 
they concluded that the only way to reduce defense expenditures 
(thereby helping to balance the federal budget) while also 
offsetting the Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, would 
be to rely more heavily on nuclear weapons - the most cost-
effective ingredient in the US arsenal." Thus, the first years of 
the Eisenhower Administration marked a significant increase in 
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the production of US nuclear weapons. By the beginning of 
1955, there were approximately 2,000 bombs in the nuclear 
stockpile; twice the number left over from Truman. Moreover, 
the inventory now included a substantial stock of deliverable H-
bombs (Mk.l7 and Mk.l8)-" 
Despite the introduction of a nuclear-armed tactical ground-to-
ground missile for the Anny, the clear winner in the struggle for 
nuclear weapons-related resources was SAC. Two years into the 
Eisenhower Administration, SAC had at its disposal more than 
2,000 aircraft deployed at more than thirty bases in and outside 
the United States. Half of the SAC force were strategic bombers 
- a proportion that was soon to increase dramatically as the first 
B-52s became operational in the spring of 1955. The depend-
ence on SAC and its nuclear missions grew even deeper when 
Charles P. Wilson, the Secretary of Defense, managed to use 
NSC-162/2- the document which formalized the decision to rely 
on nuclear weapons as the US all-purpose deterrent - to impose 
upon the chiefs of the Navy and the Army reductions in the size 
of their services." 
Even if these quantitative and qualitative improvements 
dovetailed with the over-all philosophy of the New Look, it is 
noteworthy that Truman's last defense budget (Fiscal Year 
1953) had indicated exactly the same priorities in favor of SAC, 
increased production of nuclear weapons, and an accelerated 
deployment of H-bombs. Eisenhower's decision to rely more 
heavily on nuclear weapons was therefore less innovative than 
it might seem at a first glance. Massive retaliation brought that 
position to its extreme, but its technological and material basis 
had been shaped by decisions made during the Truman 
Administration. In the words of one observer, all Eisenhower 
had to do "was provide a strategy to match the mandated force 
posture". 35 
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Once he had done that, however, the US president faced the 
converse problem of building a force posture that could uphold 
the new strategy's credibility under quickly changing techno-
logical and operational conditions. Did Eisenhower succeed? 
There is more than one answer to that question. At least for the 
first three or four years, his acquisition and deployment policies 
tallied well with the doctrine of massive retaliation. However, 
policies may have been less adequate in his second tenn. For 
instance, contemporary critics claimed that the Administration 
failed both to acknowledge and address the increasing Soviet 
offensive threat after the "Sputnik" launch in October 1957. In 
their view, the credibility of massive retaliation hedged on the 
maintenance of US nuclear superiority or, as a minimum 
requirement, a practically invulnerable second-strike capability. 
By allowing the Soviet Union to develop an offensive missile 
capability that could destroy all major US cities and the bulk of 
the US retaliatory forces in a massive first strike, the Eisen-
hower Administration, these critics charged, had ignored the sine 
qua non of deterrence. 36 
This criticism was only partly justified. Contemporary critics 
like RAND analyst Albert Wholstetter generally exaggerated the 
technological advances and military production capabilities of 
the Soviet Union. They also tended to ignore the very sub-
stantial efforts which the United States undertook in the late 
1950s to offset any emerging Soviet strategic advantages. For 
instance, Eisenhower approved acquisition plans for a total of 
250 Atlas and Titan ICBMs, 450 Minuteman ICBMs, and 19 
nuclear-capable Polaris submarines. Simultaneously, he funded 
a steady increase in the strategic bomber force, which by the 
end of 1960 counted more than 600 B-52s and nearly I ,400 B-
47s.37 He also responded to some of Wholstetter's criticism by 
asking Congress for more than $1 billion in supplementary 
defense appropriations to make the US strategic reserve less 
vulnerable to a Soviet ICBM attack." Rather than being 
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indifferent or yielding to the growing Soviet threat, therefore, 
Eisenhower responded in ways fairly consistent with both his 
budgetary conservatism and his official military doctrine. As one 
leading expert has observed, the impressive build-up of US 
strategic forces that manifested itself in the early 1960s, under 
presidents John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, in most 
respects "began during the Eisenhower Administration, and in 
many respects it preceded rather than followed the launching of 
Sputnik. "39 
Regarding employment policies, however, the Eisenhower years 
were characterized by an increasing gap in sophistication 
between the "hardware" and the "software" side of US nuclear 
strategy. On the one hand, several R&D programs pointed 
directly towards the establishment of a fully equipped triad, with 
all the mainstay strategic systems of the 1960s soon in place: the 
B-52s, the Minuteman ICBMs, and the Polaris SLBM fleet. On 
the other hand, strategic targeting and other operational aspects 
remained surprisingly unaffected by these quantitative and 
qualitative improvements in weapons and delivery systems. For 
instance, the key missions of the strategic forces remained 
basically unchanged throughout the 1950s. They continued to 
include a so-called "optimum mix" of Bravo, Delta, and Romeo 
targets, in that order of priority. The only crucial difference 
between the emergency war plans of the early and the late 1950s 
was that the JCS raised its estimate of expected enemy fatalities 
from 60 to 425 million.'" 
This tremendous increase in potential US destructiveness 
reflected in part the exponential growth in US strategic forces 
during the Eisenhower presidency, which brought the total 
number of strategic nuclear warheads up from approximately 
I ,000 to 18,000.'1 Equally important was the total rigidity that 
characterized Eisenhower's plans for nuclear warfare. Through-
out the era of massive retaliation, US employment policy was 
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guided by the cmdest of all principles: everything would go at 
once. This applies to the first Emergency War Plan of 1953 as 
well as the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SlOP) of 
1960. The latter fact is quite remarkable, since the SlOP had 
been developed in order to adjust strategic war plans in accor-
dance with three important developments: I) increasing US 
capabilities, both quantitative and qualitative; 2) improved 
strategic target intelligence due to U-2 overflights over Soviet 
territory; and 3) the soon-expected realization of the Navy's 
Polaris program. That program brought to the fore an urgent 
need for better coordination of the strategic offensive. This 
resulted in the establishment of a Joint Strategic Target Planning 
Staff (JSTPS), which in August 1960 was tasked with compiling 
a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and, on the basis of that 
list, preparing a SlOP for the entire strategic war effort.'2 In 
the words of one US expert, the "plan" behind the first SlOP 
was simplicity itself: 
Everything would go at once - the handful of early 
missiles, and several thousand gravity bombs to be 
delivered by aircraft. Every major city in Russia, Eastern 
Europe, and China would be attacked. A number of 
military and economic targets- railroad marshalling yards, 
submarine bases, airfields, hydroelectric dams, oil fields, 
mines, and the like- would also be hit in what the JSTPS 
referred to as an "optimum mix 11 .'n 
Not everybody was happy with this plan. In fact, opposition to 
this employment philosophy had surfaced as early as in the fall 
of 1957, when Army and Navy strategists began to question 
how the simultaneous employment of the entire nuclear stockpile 
could square with a strategy that, at least on paper, made a point 
of differentiating between different categories of strategic 
missions and targets. Not only did they challenge SAC's 
optimistic assessment that a fully disarming counterforce strike 
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was possible, they also claimed that the most likely employment 
scenario for the US strategic forces was not the pre-emptive 
counterforce strike contemplated by SAC, but a retaliatory strike 
in response to a Soviet .first strike that had destroyed up to 75% 
()(the US air- and ground-based strategic forces. On the basis 
of these assumptions, they called for an "alternative undertaking" 
that would put equal emphasis on destroying "government 
controls and population centers within the USSR to the extent 
necessary to neutralize the capabilities of the USSR to carry on 
the war". In addition, Army Chief of Staff Maxwell D. Taylor 
wanted a general reorientation of US defense policy, away from 
the strategic offensive in an all-out war with the Soviet Union 
and toward limited war options to be executed in local con-
tlicts44 
Why was this call for a more sophisticated and flexible targeting 
policy ignored? One obvious reason was that it did not suit the 
leaders of SAC. For one thing, the introduction of high-yield 
thermonuclear bombs had made differentiation between Bravo, 
Delta, and Romeo missions more illusionary than real. A 
megaton-range 1-1-bomb designated for a Bravo target would, in 
most instances, destroy Delta and Romeo targets as well. Had 
the possibility of executing a pure Bravo mission been more 
real, it is conceivable that this might have provided incentives 
even within SAC for a more flexible employment policy. As it 
was, however, SAC considered it a waste of scarce resources to 
develop selective options for Delta and Romeo targets that 
would be destroyed anyhow as part of the more urgent Bravo 
strikes. Moreover, the fact that the Soviet Union now had its 
own H-bombs and was on the threshold of developing an ICBM 
capability meant that SAC bases had become extremely vul-
nerable to Soviet attack. Consequently, SAC became more 
committed than ever to the Bravo mission, since its forces could 
not seriously hope to survive unless the Soviet ICBM force were 
destroyed at the very outset of a military conflict. There were 
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also non-military reasons. The Strategic Air Command, still very 
much in charge of US strategic war planning, clearly saw the 
Navy-Army critique as a threat to its own privileged position. 
Rather than accepting the call for a more flexible employment 
policy, SAC went on the offensive, presenting a methodical 
defense of counterforce targeting and trying to bring the Navy's 
Polaris program under its own planning directives." In the 
context of this inter-service rivalry, any chances for a radical 
revision of the existing US employment policy were poor 
indeed. 
SAC's opposition could have been overcome only if the Navy 
and Anny's call for a more flexible targeting policy had won 
the President's support. That was not the case, however. While 
it is true that the first SlOP deprived the President of any real 
strategic choice - practically forcing him to choose between 
national surrender or a nuclear holocaust - it had nevertheless 
become the only realistic employment policy for a strategy of 
massive retaliation. The growth in Soviet offensive capabilities 
in the late 1950s meant that the United States could no longer 
hope to neutralize the Soviet ICBM and strategic bomber forces 
with a limited counterforce strike. Some enemy weapons were 
always likely to survive the attack; some of these would most 
certainly be launched in retaliation against US targets, many of 
which would be destroyed. 
It goes without saying that the credibility of massive retaliation 
would be hard to maintain under such circumstances, since even 
a cataclysmic employment of US offensive forces could not be 
trusted to preclude the Soviets from destroying one or more 
American cities. With his professional military background, 
Eisenhower no doubt realized this." But he also realized that 
the only practical solution to this problem - namely to multiply 
the US passive and active defense capabilities- would knock the 
bottom out of his economic policies. Rather than placing the 
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national economy in jeopardy, Eisenhower decided to put his 
faith in the Soviet leadership's demonstrated distaste for military 
risk-taking. His solution to the credibility dilemma, therefore, 
was simply to confinn the public image of him as a nuclear 
Hoppalong Cassidy - a trigger-happy President personally 
committed to the notion of an apocalyptic US response to even 
the smallest Soviet provocation. The rigidity of the SlOP 
reflected this situation in the most graphic sense. At the top-
level meeting in which the plan's basic principles were decided, 
Eisenhower insisted that the whole strategic stockpile, including 
the new Polaris SLBMs, be employed in a single "simultaneous" 
blow; otherwise, the President explained, "we defeat the whole 
concept of our retaliatory effort, which takes priority over 
everything else" .47 In the words of American historian David 
Rosenberg, by the end of 1959 Eisenhower's concept of massive 
retaliation had been reduced "to a strategy of desperate resolve". 
As the President told his advisers, the central question was 
"whether or not we have the ability to destroy anyone who 
attacks us, because the biggest thing today is to provide a 
deterrent to war". 48 
In sum, while the basic technological features and deployment 
characteristics of the US strategic forces as they are known 
today first began to emerge during the Eisenhower presidency -
as evidenced by the introduction of B-52s, ICBMs, and 
SLBMs, all equipped for thennonuclear warfare - these lasting 
acquisition and deployment achievements were not matched by 
a correspondingly durable legacy on the operational level. Both 
the doctrine of massive retaliation and its matching employment 
criteria were replaced, as a matter of urgency, by the new 
Democratic Administration under John F. Kennedy. 
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Flexible response ( 1961-1963) 
The second major shift in US nuclear policy occurred in 1961-
62, when Kennedy's Secretary of Defense RobertS. McNamara 
made a series of defense policy announcements that in sum 
defined the doctrine of flexible response. In general, the new 
defense policy represented an attempt to enhance the number of 
options available to US policymakers under all realistic scen-
arios of war with the Communist world. As a first priority, this 
meant decreasing US reliance on nuclear weapons by increasing 
the conventional capabilities of the United States and its allies. 
Thus, rather than constantly raising the threat of a nuclear 
holocaust, the new Administration was hoping, -i11 the words of 
President Kennedy, to deter Communist aggression by building 
a capability to respond in kind to all acts of war, "general or 
limited, nuclear or conventional, large or small".49 Since the 
chief objective of this strategy was to minimize risks rather than 
costs, it was much more demanding, financially, than the New 
Look 50 As American political scientist Loren Thompson has 
observed, Kennedy was the first US president to try "the rich 
man's approach" to operationalizing the military requirements of 
containment. 51 
At the nuclear level, increased flexibility was sought in two 
ways. The first reflected the frustration that McNamara and 
Kennedy felt with the rigidity of the US strategic war plans left 
over from their predecessors, most notably the SlOP. As one of 
his first acts after taking office, McNamara consequently ordered 
the war planners to increase the number of nuclear options 
available to the President in case of war. More specifically, the 
revised SlOP, approved by McNamara in January 1962 but not 
implemented until a year later (which explains why it has 
become known as SIOP-63), enhanced flexibility in five ways: 
I) hy discriminating between potential enemy countries, notably 
the USSR, China, and the East European satellites, so that war 
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with one would not automatically imply a US nuclear attack 
against all of them; 2) by categorizing targets within each 
country in accordance with a general Bravo, Romeo, and Delta 
order of priorities; 3) by complementing these targeting options 
with a series of preemptive and retaliatory options designed to 
permit freedom of choice under the particular political and 
military circumstances in each case; 4) by holding back a 
strategic reserve in order to enhance so-called "intra-war 
deterrence"; and 5) by protecting and improving US command 
and control systems to allow the United States to implement 
"controlled responses" to whatever actions the enemy might 
undertake after the first nuclear exchange." 
The two latter elements point to another important aspect of 
flexible response and its corresponding employment policy (as 
codified in SIOP-63): the quest for maximum political control 
over military operations. Indeed, McNamara often referred to the 
new strategy as "controlled response". The basic idea was that 
even if the idea of a limited nuclear war was logically problem-
atic and emotionally unpleasant, it did make a lot of difference 
whether the number of US fatalities in a war with the Soviet 
Union would be ISO million, 75 million, or 10 million people. 
To enhance chances for the least unacceptable outcome, 
McNamara thought it imperative not only to limit the size of the 
initial nuclear response, but also to preserve political control 
over the strategic forces in the United States as well as the 
Soviet Union, so that negotiations could start and an agreement 
be reached to end the fighting before the full cataclysmic salvos 
were launched." 
As an integral part of this "damage limitation" strategy, McNa-
mara was inclined to steer the emphasis of US strategic planning 
away from countervalue targets (cities and non-military eco-
nomic installations) and toward counterforce targets. The SIOP-
63 thus gave primacy to the latter target category. According to 
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Desmond Ball, its five priority missions were directed against 
the following types of Soviet targets: 
I. Soviet strategic nuclear delivery forces, including 
missile sites, bomber bases, and submarine bases; 
2. other elements of Soviet military forces and military 
resources, located away from cities; 
3. Soviet military forces and military resources near cities; 
4. Soviet command and control centers and systems; and, 
if necessary, 
5. all major urban-industrial targets that were considered 
necessary to destroy in an all-out war. 54. 
In other words, SIOP-63 contained the full target spectrum from 
pure counterforce to pure counterval ue targets, but with a 
premium on the former category. However, it is questionable if 
this really meant a true revolution in US employment policy. 
For one thing, even the most selective option offered by SIOP-
63 would have launched hundreds of warheads and killed tens 
of millions of people, simply because the distinction between 
counterforce and countervalue targets was not mirrored in real 
life. As long as people continued to live in the vicinity of 
strategic installations, this sobering result could not be averted. 
But there was probably another reason involved as well. 
According to McGeorge Bundy, neither Kennedy nor McNamara 
"believed in general policy papers as a way of producing 
specific results": as far as nuclear policy was concerned, 
McNamara soon came to the conclusion that it would be "much 
easier to control strategic procurement if he did not at the same 
time challenge SAC's targeting doctrine" .55 Thus, with this 
determination to gain firm control over military acquisition and 
deployment programs, especially in the strategic field, 
McNamara may have found it necessary to reduce corres-
pondingly his influence on how the strategic forces eventually 
would be employed. 
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What impact, then, did the shift from massive retaliation to 
flexible response and damage limitation have on US acquisition 
and deployment policies? Not surprisngly, "the rich man's 
approach" led to increased efforts also in the nuclear field. 
Influenced by RAND analysts Albert Wholstetter, Bernard 
Brodie, and William W. Kaufmann, McNamara began to create 
a force posture that would provide the United States with a 
secure, reliable and controllable second-strike force - "the sine 
qua non of deterrence" in the RAND alumni's judgement. 
Wholstetter in particular had become an important influence 
within the Kennedy Administration because of his early and 
sophisticated critique of massive retaliation. In Wholstetter's 
view, that strategy had been based on the flawed assumption 
that mere possession of a significant number of H-bombs by 
each party would in itself create a stable balance of terror. 
Unfortunately, claimed Wholstetter, this was not the case: 
mutual deterrence was by no means "automatic". Instead, what 
he called the "delicate" balance of terror could be sustained only 
through a costly and continuous effort." This logic was fully 
accepted by Kennedy and McNamara. Thus, in order to enhance 
the survivability of US strategic forces, they expanded the 
Polaris program from I 9 to 41 submarines, took steps to 
improve US early warning capabilities, and put two-thirds of all 
SAC aircraft earmarked for the nuclear mission on continual 
ground alert (up from one-third under Eisenhower). At the same 
time, US offensive capabilities were increased by a decision to 
double the authorized size of the Minuteman force from 500 to 
I ,000 missiles." 
The same philosophy that underpinned these very substantial 
expansions ofEisenhower's original modernization program also 
explains why McNamara disapproved production of the B-70, 
the projected new high-altitude penetrating strategic bomber 
which the Air Force had been promoting so energetically since 
the late 1950s. Arguing that dropping higher-yield thermo-
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nuclear bombs from an altitude of 70,000 feet was contradictory 
to the new counterforce/no cities-strategy, and that the aircraft 
would be flying too high and too fast to conduct pin-point 
attacks against mobile or hardened targets, McNamara cancelled 
the $15 billion B-70 program in favor of a larger Minuteman 
force - the most formidable threat to hardened Soviet targets 
available at the time." In similar fashion, the Kennedy Adminis-
tration in 1962 secretly decided to withdraw the Thor and 
Jupiter medium-range missiles from Western Europe because 
their well-known vulnerability made them look like first-strike 
weapons. 59 
Finally, reflecting his and Kennedy's obsession with political 
control, McNamara allocated funds for an upgrading in US 
control, command, and communication capabilities. For instance, 
he established the so-called Post-Attack Command and Control 
System (PACCS), which in 1962 provided the President with a 
flying command post from which to control strategic forces in 
a nuclear war. All of these measures were expensive. Thus, 
despite the substantial build-up in US conventional forces after 
Kennedy took office, the relative costs of the strategic forces 
programs remained high. Throughout McNamara's tenure in 
office, strategic weapons systems claimed nearly one-third of 
total US defense expenditures, the Vietnam War effort exclu-
ded." 
In sum, the years 1961-63 represented a breakthrough in the US 
quest for strategic flexibility and control - if not in the sense 
that these objectives were actually achieved at the time, so at 
least in the sense that they were generally accepted by the 
political-military leadership and pursued with unreserved 
presidential support. The Administration's acquisition and 
deployment policies were basically consistent with the new 
doctrine. However, the "no-cities" approach suffered from a 
particular ambiguity caused by the fact that the forces needed 
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for first-strike and second-strike counterforce options were 
exactly the same. Since there were no objective criteria at hand 
for discriminating between them, the "counterforce/no-cities" 
strategy was almost certain to generate Soviet fears that the 
United States was in fact striving for obtain a first-strike 
capability. The emphasis on "damage limitation" could only 
deepen those concerns, since there existed no better way to limit 
damage on US society than to strike the offensive forces of the 
Soviet Union first. 
Assured destruction (1964-1973) 
McNamara also presided over the third major shift in US 
strategic nuclear doctrine, which took place during Lyndon B. 
Johnson's time in office. This shift had less to do with the 
priorities of the new president than with McNamara's own 
growing doubts about the strategy he had done so much to 
develop and implement. As early as in the summer of 1962, 
McNamara began to express uncertainty about a crucial premise 
for the damage limitation strategy, namely that the Soviet 
leadership actually shared the US assessment that it was better 
to target military installations than cities, and that it would be 
counterproductive, if not complete madness, to use all its 
strategic forces in a single cataclysmic attack. In fact, neither the 
configuration of Soviet strategic forces nor its strategic doctrine, 
as known in the West at the time, gave any reason to expect the 
Soviet Union to mirror US strategy in a nuclear war. This 
observation raised the possibility that the United States, by 
strongly committing itself to damage limitation and the counter-
force/no city strategy, was inadvertently undermining rather than 
strengthening deterrence. According to this argument, Soviet 
expectations of a very limited US response could increase 
Moscow's temptation to strike first, with all its nuclear might, 
in an attempt to knock out as many US offensive weapons as 
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possible and paralyze the US leadership before it could order a 
second, more devastating attack. A variant of the same argument 
was that the increased US counterforce capability might be 
perceived by the Soviet leadership as an intolerable threat to its 
offensive forces. In tum, that fear could stimulate a "better-
using-them-than-losing-them" sentiment among decisionmakers 
in Moscow, and provide incentives for a Soviet preventive first 
strike61 
In addition, McNamara realized that the damage limitation 
strategy would be financially more burdensome than expected. 
His pessimism was based partly on the observation that the 
Soviet Union had responded to the new US strategy by dis-
persing its ICBMs to hardened silos and stepping up its SLBM 
program. Thus, Moscow could always find relatively cheap 
countermeasures to expensive US modernization efforts, 62 
which meant that a credible US counterforce capability could be 
maintained over time only through an excessive build-up of US 
offensive strategic forces. In fact- and this appears to have been 
even more disturbing to McNamara- the Air Force was showing 
signs of using the no-cities/counter-force strategy as a criterion 
for force planning. The result was an endless stream of costly 
requests for more "counter-force" weapons, primarily Minute-
man ICBMs and the supersonic RS-70 strategic bomber." 
There were also signs that the European allies were unhappy 
with flexible response, which gave rise to suspicions that the 
United States was considering revoking its nuclear guarantee 
toward Western Europe. Most European NATO leaders believed 
that the US extended deterrent depended on a clear US com-
mitment to meet a Soviet conventional attack against Western 
Europe with a strategic nuclear response. If flexible response 
meant less US reliance on nuclear weapons and an operational 
preference for the least damaging options, the same Europeans 
feared that Moscow would conclude that there could be more to 
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gain than lose from launching a military attack on Western 
Europe. Thus, when McNamara first presented the "no- cities" 
strategy to his European NATO colleagues in May 1962, the 
audience demonstrated a total lack of enthusiasm. From that 
moment on, European reactions were permeated by mistrust, 
fear, and a feeling of being left in the lurch by the USA.64 To 
make matters worse, the British and French governments felt 
that the emphasis on damage limitation and "no-cities" targeting 
represented an indirect criticism of their own national defense 
policies. If small nuclear forces like theirs were to deter a 
superior nuclear power like the Soviet Union, this could be done 
only by posing a threat of automatic retaliation against Soviet 
cities.65 
A final concern that made McNamara lose faith in damage 
limitation stemmed from the inadequacy of US strategic defense 
systems. More will be said about the status of these systems 
later on. Suffice it here to say that McNamara found the existing 
defense systems totally inadequate - a judgement which in tum 
led him to conclude that, even under the most favorable 
circumstances, a Soviet nuclear attack would cause American 
casualties "counted in the tens of millions". On that basis, he 
told the Congress in 1963 that he did not share the opinion that 
the United States could win a nuclear strategic war "in the 
normal meaning of the word 'win'. "66 By admitting that much, 
McNamara was in reality beginning to retreat from controlled 
response and damage limitation, since that strategy had always 
been based upon the assumption that US superiority could be 
used to guarantee, not only a favorable, but indeed an accept-
able outcome of a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. With a 
mm1mum loss of tens of million people, that illusion was 
gone'' 
Profound changes in the strategic nuclear environment also 
helped to dampen the traditional US optimism that victory was 
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possible even in the nuclear age. When the Kennedy Adminis-
tration came to power in 1961, the Soviet Union had at its 
disposal only some 200 strategic bombers, and no ICBMs or 
SLBMs. In 1967, when McNamara resigned, the Soviet ICBM 
force was approaching numerical parity with the United States, 
and its growth rate was far higher - in fact, in April that year, 
the US Minuteman force reached its maximum authorized level 
of I ,000 missiles and would henceforward be subject to 
qualitative improvements only. In addition to the achievement 
of practical parity in ICBMs, the m id-1960s saw the Soviet 
military with more ICBMs in hardened silos, a growing SLBM 
force, and a possible lead in technology for anti-ballistic 
defense. Even if the United States continued to enjoyed a 
considerable lead in strategic bombers and SLBMs, the agg-
regated effect of these Soviet achievements was that the United 
States for the first time faced an opponent whose capability to 
devastate American society could not be offset by any 
quantitative build-up of US offensive forces. Thus, unless US 
scientists could make some revolutionary breakthrough in 
strategic defense - a possibility which no one in the Pentagon 
was willing to count upon - it would be practically impossible 
for the United States to limit the damage of a Soviet nuclear 
attack, at least not to an extent that would make it possible to 
present the final outcome of the war as a "victory". As 
McNamara pointed out in his last annual defense report, the 
United States "should be under no illusion that 'Damage 
Limiting' measures, regardless of how extensive they might be, 
could, by themselves, change this [mutual hostage J situation. "68 
This dispiriting acknowledgement of US vulnerability gave birth 
to a new strategic concept known as assured destruction. 69 
Since there was no way in which the two superpowers could 
effectively destroy or shield themselves against each other's 
offensive strategic systems, McNamara concluded that the only 
rational strategy for the United States would be to adopt a 
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doctrine and force posture which would help to make the Soviet 
leadership understand and accept the existing mutual hostage 
situation. That could best be achieved by building a US strategic 
force that was capable, even under the most unfavorable 
circumstances, to imposing unacceptable damage upon the 
Soviet Union. In his own definition, a US capability 
to destroy, say, one-fifth to one-fourth of her [the USSR's] 
population and one-half of her industrial capacity would serve 
as an effective deterrent. Such a level of destruction would 
certainly represent intolerable punishment to any 20th century 
industrial nation.70 
Thus, assured destruction was reminiscent of massive retaliation 
in the sense that both strategies emphasized the US will and 
capability to utterly destroy the Soviet Union should it ever dare 
to initiate hostilities against the West. McNamara's explicit 
threat of killing 20-25% of the Soviet population also implied 
a renewed emphasis on countervalue targeting, and a cor-
responding de-emphasis on damage limitation. But a closer look 
also reveals considerable discrepancies. First of all, unlike 
massive retaliation, assured destruction did not presuppose US 
superiority: it was founded on the assumption that practical 
superiority was no longer feasible. At the same time, however, 
McNamara had become convinced that, for the sake of de-
terrence, mutually recognized parity was enough. Secondly, and 
contrary to the popular myth, assured destruction did not call off 
the quest for flexibility and control which had characterized the 
first of McNamara's strategies. On this important point, 
McNamara still staged a revolutionary departure from massive 
retaliation." 
Evidence of this can be found in the Johnson Administration's 
nuclear employment policy. Despite the shift at the declaratory 
level away from counterforce and damag~ limitation, to em-
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phasis on countervalue targeting and assured destruction, no 
similar shift took place at the operational/eve/. In all important 
respects, US war plans remained essentially unchanged between 
1962 and 1968 - in fact, they were not subjected to fundamental 
revision until 1974-75. The explanation was not that the 
Pentagon ceased to review the SlOP: it was constantly reviewed. 
Rather, this lack of change indicated that McNamara wanted to 
preserve the gains that had been won during the Kennedy years 
in terms of control and flexibility. There may also have been a 
more practical side to this, however. The criterion for assured 
destruction of the Soviet Union which was cited above required 
only a small portion of the total US stock of strategic weapons. 
Thus, even if only 7% of all US ICBMs in 1968 were aimed at 
countervalue targets, that did not in itself contradict the in-
creased emphasis on such targeting implied by the doctrine of 
assured destruction 72 I 
All in all, the lack of SlOP revision should probably not be seen 
as evidence that the shift from flexible response to assured 
destruction was a matter of words only, without operational or 
other practical implications. This conclusion is confirmed by the 
direction taken in US acquisition and deployment policies during 
the final years of McNamara's tenure as Secretary of Defense. 
A striking fact about that period was that, by 1967-1968, the 
quantitative build-up of America's strategic nuclear forces had 
halted, to be replaced by a new premium on qualitative improve-
ments. 73 This decision obviously reflected the assumption that 
it was futile to seek superiority, and that the capacity to inflict 
intolerable damage upon the Soviet Union could be maintained 
at the current force level. 
Less discernible, but equally important, was the decreased 
emphasis on counterforce. Having first adopted the logic (if not 
the acronym) of mutually assured destruction, McNamara 
became concemed that an excessive increase in US counterforce 
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capability could create Soviet fears of a US first strike, and thus 
undermine the mutual hostage situation. Together with the new 
emphasis on countervalue targeting, this concern led him to 
choose a MIRV design for the new Minuteman III missile that, 
according to American political scientist Loren B. Thompson, 
"had limited but not maximum obtainable counterforce 
potential". 74 Likewise, he cancelled the production of Mark 1 7, 
a re-entry vehicle developed for use as a hard target killer on 
both the Poseidon and Minuteman missiles. In a similar vein, the 
Pentagon's justification of the MIRV program - the single most 
important strategic-technological development in the 1960s -
shifted from emphasizing its counterforce potential to empha-
sizing its capability to penetrate Soviet anti-ballistic defense 
systems. Whether the US military really abandoned the original 
rationale for wanting MIRV is an open question. What is clear, 
though, is that the new official justification was fully consistent 
with the shift in strategy, since the existence of an effective 
ABM system around the major Soviet cities and industrial 
centers would undermine the US assured destruction capability. 
McNamara's conversion from "flexible response" to "assured 
destruction" would have a tremendous impact on the course of 
US nuclear policy for the remaining twenty-five years of the 
Cold War. The self-imposed quantitative limits for the US 
strategic forces set in 1966-67 on the basis of his "assured 
destruction" criterion, would remain intact well into the Reagan 
presidency. Furthermore, his negative conclusions with regard 
to both the technological feasibility and stability implications of 
ballistic missile defense were enshrined in the ABM Treaty of 
1972, which not only was adhered to by the Ford and Carter 
Administrations but also helped to keep Reagan's SDI program 
within rather strict limits. However, as far as nuclear doctrine 
and employment policy are concerned, McNamara's debunking 
of the "counterforce/no-cities" approach had the unintended 
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consequence of calling off all serious strategic discourse in the 
United States for almost a decade. As noted by American 
historian Marc Trachtenberg, after the mid-1960s, nuclear 
strategy appeared to have hit a dead end.75 No doubt, the 
Johnson Administration's official blessing of the mutual hostage 
relationship was the primary reason for that development. After 
all, "assured destruction" was founded on the assumption that, 
in a world free of ballistic missile defense, essential parity in 
strategic offensive capabilities would in itself ensure stability 
and deter war. Under such circumstances, there hardly any tasks 
remained for the strategists. 
Escalation control (1974-79) 
The fourth significant shift in US nuclear strategy was anno-
unced by Nixon's second Secretary of Defense, James R. 
Schlesinger, in April 1974. Some of the announced changes had 
been under consideration for almost four years, but nothing 
substantial came out ofNixon's desire for more strategic options 
until after the 1972 presidential election." Thus, while it is 
true that Nixon and his advisers were eager to show that they 
felt uncomfortable with assured destruction, and occasionally 
signalled that they wanted to infuse more flexibility into nuclear 
decisionmaking, little was actually done during their first term 
beyond these very general declaratory statements. Indeed, when 
in March 1971 Nixon's first Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird 
announced a change of nuclear doctrine from Assured De-
struction to what he called "Strategic Sufficiency", it was 
evident that the transformation represented a shift of term-
inology only, not substance." 
Why, then, was the first Nixon Administration so slow m 
addressing the problems of Assured Destruction? 
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One reason was the Vietnam War, which absorbed resources and 
stole political attention from the strategic dilemmas of the US-
Soviet relationship. The search for a wider range of options was 
also hampered by technological restraints, such as lack of 
sophisticated C3 capabilities and the highly accurate warheads 
needed for realistic counterforce operations-" Most important, 
though, was the pace of the Soviet strategic build-up, which 
made US decisionmakers less concerned about the adequacy of 
their own strategy than about the prospect of Soviet superiority 
in offensive nuclear weapons systems. To avoid a shift in the 
overall strategic balance in favor of the Soviet Union, the Nixon 
Administration had to choose between two radically different 
policy options: Either to significantly step up US strategic R&D 
and production programs in order to nullify recent Soviet 
achievements, or to attempt to cap the ongoing deployment of 
new Soviet offensive systems. Since the domestic political 
situation precluded the first alternative - because of the general 
anti-militarist sentiments in the US population during the final 
phases of the Vietnam War, and because of the general eco-
nomic priorities of the 93rd and 94th Congress- Nixon decided 
to go for the latter79 The principal instrument in this regard 
was the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which in 1972 
led to the signing and ratification of two important bilateral 
agreements with the Soviet Union: the ABM Treaty and the 
SALT I "interim" Treaty. I will discuss their content and 
broader implications later on. What matters most in this context 
is that the focus on strategic anns control may go a long way 
toward explaining the absence of doctrinal changes during the 
first term of the Nixon presidency. 
Due to the Watergate scandal, Nixon's second tenn was almost 
totally dominated by domestic developments. In the shadow of 
those, however, the Administration began a thorough review of 
US nuclear policy. The aim of that review was two-fold: First 
of all, it represented an attempt to induce, once again, more 
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operational flexibility and political control into the decision-
making process concerned with employment of nuclear weapons. 
A second objective was to adjust acquisition and deployment 
policies to the, in a US perspective, worrisome changes taking 
place in the strategic environment, with detrimental effects on 
both central and extended deterrence. The US deterrent seemed 
at risk for at least three reasons: the arrival of true strategic 
parity between the superpowers; the prospect of US ICBM 
vulnerability following from an unanticipated early Soviet break-
through in MIRV technology; and the final collapse of Flexible 
Response even in the European theater, where Western 
escalation control capability was rapidly yielding to the Soviet 
bloc as a consequence of its development of new inter-medium 
range ballistic missiles (SS-20, SS-21, SS-22), new short-range 
theater weapons, and the new medium range "Backfire" bom-
ber." 
The effort to arrest these negative trends was directed by the 
new Secretary of Defense, James R. Schlesinger. As a defense 
analyst at the RAND Corporation in the 1960s, Schlesinger had 
built up for himself a record as a strong advocate of counter-
force targeting and controlled response. The crux of the so-
called "Schlesinger Doctrine" was in accordance with that 
position. 81 
As outlined in the top-secret National Security Decision 
Memorandum (NSDM)-242 -signed by Nixon in January 1974 
and thereafter "leaked" by Schlesinger in suitable portions in his 
declaratory announcement of the new doctrine - US strategic 
forces had one paramount task: to deter a nuclear attack on the 
United States and its allies. On this point there was no dis-
agreement with the priorities made under assured destruction or, 
for that matter, massive retaliation. What changed in US nuclear 
policy in the mid-1970s was rather the operational tasks that 
were to guide the employment of US offensive strategic forces 
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in a post-deterrence situation. More specifically, NSDM-242 
directed that the revised SIOP (designated SIOP-5) should 
develop plans for attacking the full spectrum of Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact forces, either in a single blow or in a number of 
increasingly severe strikes that would help to neutralize those 
elements of the enemy's forces that were considered most 
threatening in a given political-military context A second 
targeting priority was Soviet postwar recovery• assets - that is, 
the economic and political infrastructure needed by the Soviet 
leadership in order to retain power and rebuild Soviet society 
after a nuclear exchange with the United States. Again emphasis 
was put on flexibility, so that US policymakers should have the 
freedom of choosing the kinds of recovery assets which they felt 
best suited to their political war objectives." 
In addition to putting renewed emphasis on the targeting of 
Soviet military forces and recovery targets, the Nixon Adminis-
tration gave priority to the development of so-called "limited 
employment options" that would enable the United States to 
conduct selected nuclear operations in case of war. On the latter 
point, the Schlesinger Doctrine more or less echoed the position 
of the Kennedy Administration in 1961-1963, before McNamara 
had begun backtracking from flexible response_ 
However, due to the dramatic changes that had taken place in 
the strategic environment since the early 1960s, it was not 
possible simply to adopt all the doctrinal positions and emp-
loyment priorities of flexible response. Instead, Schlesinger's 
quest for increased operational flexibility and political control 
led to the introduction of several new strategic concepts and 
operational tasks. First of all, he introduced the principle of 
escalation control, which held that the National Command 
Authorities should be able to execute their favored nuclear 
options in a controlled fashion throughout a strategic nuclear 
exchange. 
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Secondly, NSDM-242 exempted population as such from the 
targeting lists - a fact that Schlesinger and other official 
spokesman were careful to stress to the public. Due to the 
limited number of pure countervalue targets in the S!OP-63, and 
the large number of civilians that would be killed if only the 
countedorce options of that plan were executed, the practical 
importance of this action may not have been very great. But it 
certainly sent an important symbolic signal to the Western 
public and Soviet authorities alike. 
Thirdly, it determined that certain vital enemy targets- such as 
oil installations, industrial plants and Soviet centers of political-
military control - should be held "hostage to subsequent 
destruction" tor the purpose of intra-war deterrence and intra-
war bargaining. The revolutionary idea behind the latter decision 
was that escalation control meant more than the capability to 
match and overwhelm your opponent at all conceivable levels of 
hostility; equally importantly, it presupposed the capability to 
shield, on a temporary basis, some enemy targets whose survival 
were deemed crucial to the possibility of negotiating a peaceful 
settlement of the conflict. 
Finally, the Schlesinger Doctrine also included the notion of a 
secure reservefiJrce- that is, an arsenal of practically invincible 
weapons, notably the SLBMs, that could survive all waves of 
Soviet attack and give US authorities a superior post-war 
. . . ' 8] 
negotiation posJtJon. 
These changes were implemented both at the declaratory level 
and at the employment level (that is, in S!OP-5). At least in that 
particular sense, the Schlesinger years were characterized by a 
rare consistency between US strategic doctrine and targeting 
policy. Paradoxically, the unprecedented openness about US 
intentions in case of nuclear war confirms that, even for a 
nuclear "war fighter" like Schlesinger, the immediate political-
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strategic value of US nuclear forces far outstripped their 
potential operational value in any future war. As he later told 
the author, the chief purpose of his frankness was not to initiate 
a doctrinal discussion with his Soviet counterparts or to give the 
war planners in Moscow an easier job, but simply to make the 
US deterrent more credible. "My primary ambition", the former 
Secretary of Defense said, was "to manipulate the minds of the 
Soviets.,. 84 
That ambition arose from a growing fear within the US national 
security establishment that the Soviet leaders might not, after all, 
accept the idea of a strategic stalemate. In the judgement of US 
experts at the time, the immense increase in Soviet offensive 
strategic weapons during the late 1960s and early 1970s had 
brought the Soviet Union to the verge of acquiring a real first-
strike capability against the US ICBM force." Against this 
backdrop, American analysts began to take a second look at the 
doctrinal statements of Soviet military and political decision-
makers, an exercise which brought many of them to the 
conclusion that Moscow had never accepted the logic of mutual 
assured destruction (MAD). Instead, Soviet nuclear strategy 
emerged as a war-fighting strategy, based on the assumption that 
it was indeed possible to "win" a nuclear war - provided1 of 
course, that one's acquisition, deployment and employment 
policies were shaped with this dark objective in mind. 
If this interpretation of Soviet strategy and weapons programs 
was correct, then US targeting policy and force posture could be 
seen as utterly inadequate. At least, this was how Schlesinger 
and his Pentagon assistants came to look at it. In their view, the 
new strategic realities made it imperative for the United States 
to possess counterforce capabilities similar or superior to those 
emerging on the Soviet side. Moreover, the United States would 
have to acquire the operational flexibility and control capacity 
needed for nuclear war-fighting; otherwise, the Soviets would 
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simply cease to fear the consequences of nuclear war. To bolster 
the US deterrent, therefore, it was necessary to adopt a nuclear 
doctrine and force posture that could help to "manipulate the 
minds of the Soviets" - in other words, to convince them that 
whatever level of nuclear war-fighting they initiated, they would 
find that US capabilities surpassed their own. 
The Schlesinger Doctrine was an attempt to address the pro-
blems raised by the changes in the strategic environment and the 
assumed asymmetry between US and Soviet nuclear strategy. 
We have already established that there was a remarkable degree 
of consistency between the Schlesinger Doctrine and US nuclear 
employment policy at the time. Now we should ask whether this 
holds true also with regard to acquisition and deployment 
policies. 
The answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, these 
Administrations took important steps towards modernizing and 
augmenting the offensive strategic capabilities of the United 
States, including its counterforce capability. This was done in 
part by an extensive MIRVing of the ICBM force - a relatively 
cheap way of increasing US offensive capabilities without 
violating the SALT I agreement - and in part by funding an 
R&D program for a new "experimental" ICBM with a radically 
improved counterforce potential (the Mark 21 or "MX" 
missile)." 
The MIRVing of the Minuteman force began in 1970, and 
continued throughout the Nixon-Ford Administrations. It is 
noteworthy that this development went on unaffected by the 
signing of the ABM Treaty, even though McNamara had used 
the emerging Soviet ABM capability as the principal just-
ification for the MIRV program. That the MlRVing accelerated 
after the ABM problem had been solved, gives further evidence 
of the shift toward counterforce targeting during the Nixon-Ford 
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years. All in all, the MIRVing of ICBMs and SLBMs led to a 
fourfold increase in operational ballistic missile warheads - up 
from a total of 1,710 in 1970 to more than 7,000 warheads a 
decade later. In addition, the warheads themselves were made 
more efficient against hardened targets." These quantitative 
and qualitative changes were a necessary condition for the more 
extensive and flexible targeting options developed under the 
Schlesinger Doctrine. 
In similar fashion, the doctrinal emphasis on a secure reserve 
force was supported by Nixon's prior decision, in early I 972, to 
approve development and production of a new generation of 
strategic submarines, the Trident class, as well as two alternative 
ballistic missiles, the Trident I and II, for deployment on the 
new vessel. Because of the higher yield and accuracy of these 
weapons systems, especially Trident II, the US SLBM force 
would for the first time obtain true counterforce strike cap-
ability. This meant that the United States, at least in theory, 
would be able to launch its entire ICBM force and still maintain 
a secure reserve force capable of executing follow-up attacks 
against the whole spectrum of Soviet targets, including missile 
silos and hardened C' installations." 
The quest for greater flexibility was supported also by several 
decisions taken in order to strengthen the survivability and 
offensive capabilities of the strategic bomber force. As early as 
in 1969, Nixon's first Secretary of Defense, Melvin Laird, 
cancelled the multi-purpose FB-I I I aircraft - McNamara's pet 
project - whose deployment had been resisted by SAC because 
of its alleged vulnerability to Soviet air defense. In its place, 
Laird approved an expensive R&D program for a new, high-
performance penetrating bomber, soon to be known as the B-1. 
The proposed upgrading of the bomber leg was fully consistent 
with the quest for more flexibility and control. For instance, 
strategic bombers were commonly regarded as the superior 
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choice for "search-and-destroy" missions against targets that 
either survived the preceding ICBM strike or were hold in 
reserve for intra-war deterrence, such as mobile weapons 
systems and C' units. In addition, the capability of the B-52s to 
penetrate Soviet air defense was enhanced by the deployment of 
the AGM-69A Short Range Attack Missile (SRAM), which 
made it possible for the strategic bombers to destroy enemy 
targets from a 300 km standoff position. 89 
Obviously, follow-up and standoff missions of this sort would 
be impossible to execute unless a large portion of the strategic 
bombers were able to survive a Soviet first strike. Thus, Laird 
also took steps to enhance the invulnerability of the bomber leg. 
He implemented the so-called satellite basing program; this 
dispersed the SAC force over a much larger number of air 
bases, thereby increasing the number of targets which a Soviet 
SLBM attack would have to destroy. Because the number of 
aircraft stationed at each base went down, satellite basing also 
helped to increase the speed by which the SAC force could 
become airborne in an emergency.'" 
And finally, the doctrine of escalation control was supported by 
a series of decisions aimed at providing US decisionmakers with 
what Laird described as a "reliable, flexible and survivable 
command and control system"!' Among the measures imp-
lemented were the Command Data Buffer System which 
reportedly cut re-programming time for the Minuteman force 
from 36 hours to 25 minutes; the Fleet Satellite Communications 
System, and a new Advanced Airborne National Command Post. 
In sum, these systems made it harder for the Soviets to destroy 
the political and military command structure of the United 
States. In consequence, they would help the National Command 
Authorities to perform their predestined roles even after a Soviet 
first strike. 92 
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The major problem with the Schlesinger Doctrine in terms of 
consistency was that, at the time it was announced, few of the 
above-mentioned acquisitions had reached the stage of pro-
duction, not to mention deployment. Hence, in terms of military 
hardware, the Doctrine was in many ways premature: it pre-
supposed capabilities that as yet were non-existent. At the same 
time, it represented a long over-due revision of the assured 
destruction/strategic suffienciency doctrines, and helped to speed 
up those improvements on the hardware side necessary to make 
it a credible alternative to these outdated strategies. Ironically, 
perhaps, by the time the projected improvements were beginning 
to materialize, Schlesinger's successors were not only busy 
relining his doctrine but had also decided that its credibility 
hinged on further qualitative advances in the supporting 
hardware. 
The countervailing strategy (1980-1991) 
At the declaratory level, US nuclear policy exhibited an 
extraordinary degree of continuity from 1974 to the end of the 
Cold War in the early 1990s. The same conclusion seems to 
hold true also with regard to how, in case of general war, US 
authorities were planning to employ their nuclear forces. Even 
though both Carter and Reagan accused their immediate 
predecessors of having neglected the growth in Soviet nuclear 
capabilities, neither president initiated any radical changes in US 
nuclear doctrine and nuclear weapons employment policy. On 
the contrary, just as the Carter Administration's review of US 
nuclear strategy led to a confirmation of the Schlesinger 
Doctrine, the Reagan Administration was quick to adopt the 
targeting priorities and operational plans of the Carter Adminis-
tration. Indeed, US strategic nuclear doctrine and employment 
policy was not to undergo any major revision until after George 
Bush had left office in early 1993.93 
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The quintessence of the doctrines and employment policies of 
the Carter, Reagan and Bush Administrations was the same as 
it had been under the second Nixon and Ford Administrations: 
escalation control. Now referred to as the countervailing 
strategy, official US nuclear strategy continued to stress such 
crucial elements of the Schlesinger Doctrine as selective strike 
options and intra-war deterrence. It also confirmed the position 
that, in order to bolster the US deterrent, it was necessary to 
establish a credible counterforce capability, a secure strategic 
reserve force, and a survivable C' network. As with the 
Schlesinger Doctrine, the main tasks of US strategic forces were 
defined as deterring nuclear war, and, should deterrence fail and 
war break out, enforcing an early termination of the conflict on 
terms favorable to the United States. These tasks and objectives 
were central themes in Presidential Directive (PD)-18 of 24 
August 1977, the Carter Administration's major overall state-
ment on US national strategy toward the Soviet Union. They 
were confirmed and elaborated upon in PD-53 of November 
1979, which committed the government to develop tele-
communication facilities adequate for maintaining effective 
political control "during and after any national emergency"; in 
PD-58 of June 1980 on "Continuity of Government" in a nuclear 
war; and in PD-59 of July 1980 which defined the Adminis-
tration's nuclear weapons employment policy." 
Rather than defining a new US strategic doctrine, these docum-
ents actually helped to refine the strategy of escalation control 
developed by Schlesinger. In the words of Secretary of Defense 
Harold Brown, PD-59 did not represent "a radical departure 
from US strategic policy over the past decade or so." Instead, it 
restated more clearly "the same essential strategic doctrine [ ... ] 
in the light of current conditions and current capabilities. "95 
What had changed in the past ten years, Brown explained, were 
Soviet offensive capabilities, Soviet doctrine, and Soviet C' 
capabilities. The capabilities had grown, and the doctrine had 
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become increasingly focused on what Marshal Ogarkov and 
other authoritative Soviet sources systematically referred to as 
"objective possibilities for achieving victory" in a prolonged 
nuclear war. Faced with these realities, the Carter Administration 
concluded that the best way to keep the Soviets from believing 
that they could gain anything from starting a nuclear war -
limited or unlimited, short or prolonged - was for the United 
States to make deadly serious preparations for such scenarios 
itself."' 
The crucial challenge was to decide what doctrine, force 
posture, and C3 facilities could best enable the United States to 
get this crucial message through to the Soviet leadership. As 
Brown saw it, the answer was to make US doctrine and AED 
policies more like those of the Soviet Union. The best way to 
enhance the credibility of the US nuclear deterrent would be by 
demonstrating readiness and capability to outclass the Soviets on 
their own turf- that is, to prevail in a nuclear war.97 
Moreover, Soviet leaders were more likely to be deterred if they 
learned that the United States was aiming part of its strategic 
forces at targets crucial to their own ability to retain power atier 
the shooting had stopped. In Brown's words, "whatever it is that 
the Soviet leadership counts as most important to it, would be 
threatened and ( ... ] destroyed" by US forces in the event of 
nuclear war. As examples of such first-priority assets, Brown 
mentioned Soviet industry, population centers, military forces, 
and - as the only novel target category - centers of political-
military decisionmaking9 " The latter category was included on 
the first-priority target list under the assumption that, more than 
anything else, the Soviet leadership feared the destruction of 
institutions and communication networks necessary for main-
taining the Communist Party's control of the USSR.''" 
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Another novelty in PD-59, not explicitly mentioned by Brown, 
was that US strategic nuclear forces would be aimed also at 
forward-based Soviet conventional forces, According to General 
William Odom, who in his capacity as military adviser to 
Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote most of PD-59, the aim was to 
destroy some particularly valuable units of these forces in the 
initial stage of a military conflict As he later told this author, 
the underlying idea was that the Soviet leaders would be much 
more sensitive to such assaults on their military "base", in the 
marxist sense of the word, than to the firing of, say, a nuclear 
warning shot high above the ground at some remote place far 
away from the actual fighting. 100 
The tasks and priorities identified in PD-59 were conscientiously 
echoed in the Carter Administration's targeting plans. For 
instance, the !980 Single Integrated Operation Plan, SlOP-50, 
identified more than 700 "political" targets - including party 
headquarters, government administrative centers, and under-
ground shelters for key Soviet officials. By placing this target 
category at the top of the priority list, Carter's war planners took 
a major step towards enabling the US president to engage in a 
protracted limited nuclear war with the Soviet Union. The 
second most important target category was Soviet strategic 
nuclear systems; approximately 2,000 such targets were listed, 
including I ,400 ICBM silos. In third place, to help make 
possible the attack against the non-strategic military base, a total 
of more than 3,000 airfields, Red Army divisions, supply depots, 
and logistic centers were picked out for possible destruction."' 
Despite their vociferous criticism of Carter's defense policies 
during the 1980 presidential campaign, Ronald Reagan and his 
advisers soon discovered that they had few disagreements with 
their predecessor on nuclear policy matters. In October 1981, 
President Reagan approved two important National Security 
Decision Directives, NSDD-12 and NSDD-13, that confirmed 
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the principal tasks, priorities, and doctrinal conclusions ofPD-53 
and PD-59. Reagan's endorsement of the countervailing strategy 
was evidenced also by the content of the new Nuclear Weapons 
Employment Policy (NUWEP-82), signed by his first Secretary 
of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, in July 1982. No parts of this 
document have yet been made public, but it is widely believed 
to have reiterated the content of SIOP-50. 102 
Apparently, there were only a few significant differences 
between the doctrines and nuclear weapons employment policies 
of the Carter and Reagan-Bush Administrations. Starting with 
the doctrines, the years 1981-1992 saw a marked renaissance of 
the notion of the 1950s and early 1960s that it would be 
possible for the United States to win a nuclear war. In contrast 
to PD-59, which rejected the possibility of such a victory and, 
in Brown's words, only sought to convince the Soviets that they, 
too, were deprived that possibility, the official position of the 
Reagan-Bush Administrations was that the United States must 
obtain the capability of prevailing in a nuclear war - that is, 
winning. Closely related to this, the Reagan Administration also 
endorsed the possibility of a protracted nuclear conflict between 
the superpowers, and asked Congress for money to build 
strategic forces and C' networks that could be trusted to function 
in a prolonged nuclear war of up to 180 days. 103 
As for the possible employment of nuclear weapons, the SlOPs 
of the Reagan and Bush Administrations (SlOP-SF to -6F) 
differed from the last Carter SlOP (SIOP-5E) in allocating far 
more weapons for the tasks of destroying Soviet mobile targets 
(especially SS-20s, SS-24s and SS-25s) and hardened Soviet 
leadership bunkers. Some 4,000 relocatable targets and more 
than I ,500 leadership targets are reported to have been included 
in the first version of SIOP-6.104 Both of these target 
categories were consistent with the new doctrinal emphasis on 
protracted nuclear war-fighting. 
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These differences should not be exaggerated, however. Rather 
than representing a sharp break with the past, the Reagan 
Administration's talk of victory and protracted nuclear war in 
many ways brought the countervailing strategy to its logical 
conclusion. After all, the basic principal of that strategy had 
been that, in order to deter the Soviets, the US should always 
demonstrate the same war-fighting capabilities as the Soviets 
themselves were demonstrating. As long as the Soviet military 
and political leadership appeared to operate on the assumption 
that victory was possible, even in a protracted nuclear conflict, 
it followed that US authorities should adopt the same position, 
only with more potent strategic forces in reserve. Thus, in the 
end, the principal difference between the Reagan and the Carter 
Administrations' versions of the countervailing strategy was that 
the former was more ambitious on the part of the United States. 
Whereas Carter had operated on the basis of a slight over-all US 
edge in strategic forces, 105 Reagan apparently believed in the 
possibility of moving ahead from that favorable position toward 
a situation of US strategic superiority. 106 
In all likelihood, the Reagan Administration's quest for strategic 
superiority was the major causal factor behind its excessive 
build-up of US conventional and strategic nuclear forces, 
particularly in 1981-1984. But again we should note that the 
build-up had been started by Carter, and that most of the new 
strategic capabilities of the 1980s were a result of decisions 
made before Reagan took office. For instance, such crucial 
decisions as to produce and deploy the MX missile, the Trident 
submarine, and the nuclear-capable Air-Launched Cruise Missile 
(ACLM) for the B-52 bomber force were all made in 1977-79. 
Together, they resulted in a significant modernization of all 
three legs of the strategic triad. In this way, the United States 
was able both to maintain an assured destruction capability, and 
- thanks to the MX and Trident programs - to enhance sub-
stantially its counterforce capability. In addition, bombs and 
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warheads more capable of penetrating hardened Soviet targets 
were developed and deployed. Carter also approved R&D 
funding for the "stealth" aircraft program, an effort which 
eventually led to the production of the B-2 bomber. In similar 
fashion, Carter was responsible for the highly controversial 
decision to deploy new inter-medium range tactical nuclear 
missiles in Western Europe, the Pershing II and the ground-
launched cruise missile (GLCM). In order to increase the 
operational flexibility and the overall military capability of the 
West, Carter also put pressure on the European NATO countries 
to commit themselves to a 3% annual real growth in defense 
spending. 107 
These achievements do not mean that there were no differences 
in the strategic defense modernization programs of the Carter 
and Reagan Administrations, however. Besides the latter's 
willingness to spend more money on almost every program, 
there were in particular three noteworthy differences: 
The first was that Reagan revised his predecessor's decision of 
June 1977 not to produce the B- 1 bomber. A number of factors 
had helped Carter to reach that conclusion, but, in the last 
analysis, the cancellation was based on his doubts about the 
penetrating bomber mission. Given the constant improvement of 
Soviet air defense capabilities, Carter accepted the judgement of 
many civilian experts that it would be increasingly difficult for 
a large, low-altitude aircraft like the B-1 bomber to reach its 
targets. Carter decided instead to spend the taxpayers' money on 
a more cost-effective and, as he saw it, more "technically sweet" 
weapons system: the ALCM. Not only was it far less expensive 
to develop and deploy, it was also thought to be far more 
capable of penetrating Soviet air defense. In combination with 
the B-52s, which would be used as standoff platforms, ALCMs 
were intended to guarantee a powerful and survivable strategic 
bomber force in another ten to twenty years. 10' 
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Reagan's decision to re-start the B-1 program may to some 
extent be explained in terms of bureaucratic politics and the 
political momentum created by his own campaign promises. 
However, it was consistent also with the modifications that his 
Administration initiated with regard to doctrine and employment 
policy. If the aim was superiority - real or apparent - it made 
good sense to deploy a weapon that would force the Soviets to 
put more of its scarce resources into defensive rather offensive 
capabilities. 109 When added to the B-52 force, the higher speed 
and much better low-altitude performance of the B-1 aircraft (or, 
more accurately, the B-1 b "stealth" version of it) would enhance 
the operational flexibility of US strategic forces. These charac-
teristics were particularly relevant in light of the doctrinal 
emphasis on prevailing in a protracted nuclear conflict. Under 
such planning directives, the potential value of a re-targetable 
penetrating bomber force with a short escape time seemed much 
more obvious than it had under the scenarios contemplated by 
the Carter Administration. In similar fashion, acceleration ofB-2 
"stealth" bomber production was logical in light of the high 
priority which SIOP-6 attached to destruction of relocatable 
targets and hardened leadership bunkers. 110 
Having approved plans to build and deploy a total of 100 B-Ib 
and 132 B-2 bombers, with a price-tag of respectively $35 and 
$80 billion pr. program, 111 Reagan went on to modernize the 
sea-based component of the triad by accelerating development 
of the counterforce-capable Trident II (D-5) SLBM. 112 He also 
decided to equip US attack submarines and surface vessels with 
nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)113 - an 
acquisition program that, in tum, led to the adoption of the 
highly controversial "maritime strategy" for offensive war-
fighting operations in the Norwegian and Barent Seas. 
The motives for these decisions may have been multiple, but it 
is tempting to see them primarily as rational choices emerging 
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from a more general determination to enhance escalation control 
and regain what we might call marginal strategic superiority. 
What complicates the picture, though, is that the Reagan 
Administration was so slow in making up its mind about the 
MX program. If first priority were given to the task of threat-
ening Soviet strategic forces and hardened military-political C 3 
centers, the logical next step would be to ensure a swift 
deployment of the MX, since nothing could do more to enhance 
the US counterforce capability. Instead, the Reagan Adminis-
tration abandoned the so-called "multiple protective shelter" 
(MPS) basing mode chosen by the Carter Administration, • 
claiming that, despite its huge costs, it could not protect the 
ICBM force from a Soviet first strike. Lacking a clear alter-
native concept, the Administration thereafter spent the next two 
years analyzing other basing modes - a costly process which 
certainly did little to close the window of vulnerability. After the 
Administration's initial preference for a so-called "dense pack" 
basing mode had encountered massive opposition in the 
Congress," Reagan in April 1983 decided instead to halve the 
· The MPS :-;y.stcm involved a force of 200 MX missiles, each of which would 
be randomly shifted around on a closed circuit of 23 hardened protective 
shelters. The logic of this "shell game" was that, if the missiles were 
successfully disguised, the Soviet Union would have to target and destroy all 
23 shelters in order to be sure of eliminating the single MX on any given 
circuit 
·· According to this plan, the MX missiles would be placed in densely packed 
tields, but with sufficient spacing between the silos so that each attacking 
warhead could destroy no more than two silos. On the basis of the assumption 
that the dust raised by one aUacking warhead would produce a cloud through 
which subsequent warheads could not pass for some time (the so-called 
"fratricide" effect), the supporters of the system argued that the destruction of 
one silo would thus protect its siblings. Critics argued that it was too risky to 
base the survivability of the MX force on the fratricide phenomenon, which 
was poorly understood scientifically and practically untested. 
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proposed MX force, down to I 00 missiles, and place it in the 
old Minuteman silos.'" 
Thus, the end result came very close to the original proposal of 
the Nixon-Ford Administrations. Unfortunately, the basic flaw 
with the original plan- that a ten-warhead missile in a fixed silo 
was "a fat and easy target" for MIRVed Soviet SS-18s and SS-
19s115 - had not been addressed. Quite the opposite, the 
Scowcroft Commission which Reagan organized to assess the 
adequacy of the US strategic force posture and modernization 
programs, concluded that the vulnerability of the land-based leg 
of the triad could not be fixed through any of the suggested 
mobile basing modes. Instead of wasting money on such basing 
systems, therefore, the Report proposed that, for the future, the 
United States would have to rely even more heavily on its 
SLBM programs. In addition, it recommended development of 
a small, single-head and highly accurate ICBM to be deployed 
in 11 more than one mode 11 no later than 1993. 11 {! 
Reagan's predicament with the MX program had several 
reasons, the most fundamental being that his Administration was 
not perfectly honest in its official justification of the system. In 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, people like Paul Nitze, Richard 
Perle, and Caspar Weinberger were promoting MX deployment 
as a necessary counterweight to the threat of the Soviet heavy 
ICBMs - in other words, as a means to close the alleged 
"window of opportunity". This justification forced them to put 
premium on the system's basing mode, since placing new 
advanced MX missiles in old fixed Minuteman silos would do 
nothing to solve the vulnerability problem. In reality, however, 
their primary reason for supporting MX deployment was the 
system's offensive capabilities: the speed, accuracy, throw-
weight, and advanced ten-warhead re-entry vehicles that would 
provide the United States with a superior land-based counter-
force weapon. The prominence of this motive was revealed by 
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the Administration's decision, in early 1983, to deploy 100 MX 
missiles in old Minuteman silos. By then, two blue-ribbon 
panels had searched in vain for an alternative basing mode to 
the "race track" system proposed by Carter, which had become 
politically unsalable for economic and ecological reasons. Both 
panels concluded that there was, in effect, no basing mode 
option that could possibly solve the ICBM vulnerability 
problem. That the Administration not only accepted this 
conclusion, but also decided to deploy the MX irrespective of its 
inability to close the "window of opportunity", clearly confirms 
that the overriding motive was of another kind. In the words of 
General Brent Scowcroft, who headed the last of the two blue-
ribbon panels, the ultimate intent behind the deployment 
decision was "to shore up deterrence" by conveying to the 
Soviets "our capacity to go after their theoretically vulnerable 
land-based missile force. It is that which the acquisition of the 
MX missile provides to the United States."'" 
Albeit a logical necessity, this shift of official rationale was not 
very helpful in gathering congressional support for the MX 
program, which by then was estimated to cost American tax 
payers no less than $20 billion. Interestingly, this failure to 
solve the vulnerability problem seemed to frustrate the president 
as well. Apparently, Reagan had never felt comfortable with the 
notion of limited nuclear war-fighting nor with the threat of 
massive retaliation."" It was no accident, therefore, that the 
decision to deploy the MX, without adding anything to enhance 
the survivability of the ICBM force, coincided with a dramatic 
presidential initiative in the area of strategic defense: the SOl 
proposal of March 1983. Thus, once the MX decision was made 
in early 1983, Reagan's quest for security in the nuclear age 
began moving rapidly away from deterrence through acquisition 
of superior offensive forces towards arms reductions and 
revolutionary concepts of ballistic missile defense. 
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This resulting shift of focus from offense to defense leads us to 
our next topic: the role of strategic arms control and strategic 
defense in US nuclear policy during the Cold War. 
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The evolution of US policy on strategic arms control 
and ballistic missile defense 
As the offensive capabilities of the Soviet Union began growing 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the United States came to rely in-
creasingly on strategic arms control as an instrument for main-
taining a favorable, or at least stable, balance of forces. To a 
large extent, that meant using arms control for the purpose of 
preventing the development or restricting the deployment of 
Soviet strategic weapons systems which Washington perceived 
as being particular threatening or destabilizing. 
Here we must recall the distinction between arms control and 
disarmament. Whereas these concepts were often used 
synonymously in the pre-nuclear age, and even in the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, they were refined and made more analytically 
precise in the late 1950s, particularly by those US defense 
intellectuals who claimed that national security could best be 
obtained by measures that enhanced strategic stability vis-a-vis 
the Soviet Union. Since then, it has become a standard phrase 
that arms control and disarmament are concerned with the same 
subject- weapons and arms races- but not necessarily with the 
same object. Proponents of nuclear disarmament generally 
regard arms as a root cause of war, and therefore support arms 
reductions as part of a process intended to lead, ultimately, to 
the elimination of the principal means of international violence: 
offensive weapons. Because of their indiscriminate and 
genocidal nature, nuclear weapons quickly became their first-
priority target - indeed, many advocates of nuclear disarmament 
claimed, and continue to claim, that these weapons are illegal 
and immoral in themselves, and therefore should be banned by 
international law. In sum, proponents of nuclear disarmament 
tend to seek nuclear arms reduction for its own sake, not as a 
means of any other policy objective. In contrast, the US arms 
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control "school" that emerged in the early 1960s, with Thomas 
C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin as its leading spokesmen, 
saw nuclear arms control as an instrument of traditional 
diplomacy and security policy. In their view, its principal 
objective was to help to stabilize US relations with the Com-
munist rival states so as to reduce the risk of uncontrolled arms 
racing and military aggression. The aim was not arms reduction 
for its own sake; on the contrary, Schelling and his followers 
were firmly committed to deterrence, and saw nuclear weapons 
as crucial instruments also in that respect. What they wanted, 
then, was to use strategic arms control as an instrument that 
could help in maintaining the mutual hostage situation (the 
superior form of deterrence, in their view), reduce the costs of 
the strategic arms race, and, most importantly, enhance inter-
national stability. 119 
Strategic arms control, therefore, was never a particular liberal 
enterprise in the United States. Its chief advocates were the 
"owls" - moderate internationalists in both major parties with a 
realist approach to the problems of international politics and the 
Cold War. However, also typical "doves" and "hawks" could at 
times come out strongly in favor of arms control, but then "arms 
control" usually was seen as an instrument either of disarmament 
or US military resurgence. 120 To a large degree, the domestic 
controversy over US arms control policies in the 1970s and 
1980s can be seen as a clash between these three fundamentally 
different approaches to the issue. 
Either for domestic political reasons or because it was thought 
technologically feasible to offset at least a part of the offensive 
capabilities of the Soviet Union, US policymakers also made 
occasional attempts at developing an American capability for 
strategic defense. This was done in two different, though 
perfectly compatible, ways. The first was to invest resources in 
civilian and other so-called passive defense systems, like blast 
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and fallout shelters for the urban populations. A second, and 
technologically more demanding task, was to develop active 
strategic defense systems - radars, early warning sensors, and 
anti-aircraft or anti-missile systems capable of intercepting an 
attack by Soviet strategic forces. The latter objective was always 
controversial, though, since a breakthrough in active strategic 
defense technology could easily undermine Soviet self-con-
fidence and, in the worst case, provide incentives for a Soviet 
first strike prior to the new system's deployment. As with 
strategic arms control, the interest of US decisionmakers in 
strategic defense was influenced by various factors - ranging 
from humanitarian concerns on behalf of the urban populations, 
to ambitions of finding a reliable way of neutralizing the Soviet 
offensive threat, thereby retaining a lost or threatened US 
strategic superiority. 
Pre-MAD: High jumps, low fences. Truman, Eisen-
hower, and Kennedy 
For a brief period in 1945-46, the Truman Administration 
appeared seriously interested in reaching an agreement with the 
Soviet Union on international atomic energy control, including 
provisions that would ultimately give the Atomic Energy 
Authority of the United Nations a monopoly on nuclear wea-
pons. The US proposal, put forward in the Baruch Plan of June 
1946, presented a scheme for a gradual transfer of US atomic 
energy "secrets" to the UN. Provided that all other nations 
refrained from starting their own nuclear weapons program, the 
United States would - after a transition period of 7-12 years -
place its entire nuclear weapons stockpile under UN cus-
tody.'" 
The sincerity of this proposal has been a matter of historical 
debate. On the other hand, all sources seem to indicate that the 
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Soviets, on their part, never seriously contemplated any scheme 
for international control that would deny them the right to 
develop the same capabilities that had already been developed 
by the United States. The Baruch Plan was totally unacceptable 
to Moscow. Instead, Soviet authorities proposed an alternative 
plan in which the United States, as a necessary first step, would 
dismantle its entire nuclear weapons stockpile and sign an 
international treaty outlawing all development, production of 
nuclear weapons. As a consequence of these incompatible 
positions, the UN negotiations broke down in late 1946.122 
The Truman Administration reacted to this development by 
giving more priority to its nuclear weapons program. As Truman 
told a group of congressional leaders in July 1949, "since we 
can't obtain international control, we must be strongest in 
atomic weapons". 123 What changed this exclusive focusing on 
the offensive dimension of the US nuclear deterrent, was the 
successful Soviet nuclear weapons test in September that year. 
Whereas policymakers and experts like George F. Kennan and 
J. Robert Oppenheimer recommended that the United States 
should use tbe opportunity to make a last attempt in favor of 
nuclear disarmament, Truman's first response to the new Soviet 
threat was to order a crash program for developing a hydrogen 
or "super" bomb. 124 In less than a year, however, this and 
other efforts to enhance US offensive nuclear capabilities were 
supplemented with measures to enhance the protection of 
American society against a Soviet nuclear attack."' With this 
particular purpose in mind, and acting upon recommendations 
from the Air Force and the National Security Council (NSC), 
Truman in November 1950 established the Air Defense Com-
mand. Immediately thereafter, his Administration negotiated an 
agreement with Canada that allowed the United States to deploy 
a northern-facing early warning radar system on Canadian 
territory. Construction work on the so-called Pinetree Line 
started in early 1951. 
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The efficacy of that first active nuclear defense system was soon 
questioned, however. In the summer of 1952, an MIT study 
group strongly recommended that it be replaced by a techno-
logically more advanced system, which the MIT experts assessed 
could prevent some 85-95% of the attacking Soviet bombers 
from reaching their targets. On the basis of this and similar 
evaluations from the National Security Resources Board, 
Truman marked the very last day of 1952 by signing an 
executive order calling for the earliest possible construction of 
a three-tier continental air defense system. It consisted of a so-
called Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line - a radar network 
within the Arctic circle meant to detect the incoming strategic 
bombers hours before they could reach US territory - and two 
additional perimeters of warning and control sensors to sort out 
the threat and help the Strategic Defense Command to vector 
interceptors that would meet the attackers and destroy them. 126 
In sum, the Truman years were characterized by an initial, but 
short-lived quest for international control and nuclear disar-
mament, followed by a more durable attempt at building US 
security on its monopoly on nuclear weapons. When the 
monopoly ended, the Truman Administration tried to maintain 
the credibility of the US deterrent in two complementary ways: 
First of all by further increasing the offensive capability of US 
nuclear forces, and, secondly, by decreasing US vulnerability to 
nuclear attack by means of active strategic defense measures. 
Throughout its eight years in office, the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration did not depart significantly from the arms control and 
strategic defense policies implemented by its predecessor after 
the Soviet a-bomb test. Eisenhower fully shared Truman's 
negative assessment of the prospects for international control of 
nuclear weapons, and thought that the intensity of the Cold War 
precluded any serious consideration of a bilateral US-Soviet 
arms control agreement. Thus, except for some propagandistic 
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calls for "universal disarmament" and a round of inclusive talks 
on a possible comprehensive test ban- which, by the way, were 
motivated by medical and ecological rather than strategic 
concerns - no important nuclear arms control initiatives were 
made during the Eisenhower years. 127 Instead, both super-
powers may actually have felt that they had more to lose than 
to gain from engaging in serious arms control talks at that time. 
The US side because it enjoyed such a comfortable lead in 
almost any important strategic category, and had based its 
national security policy on the assumption of nuclear superiority. 
The Soviets either because they actually believed that they were 
beginning to close the gap, or because they feared that arms 
control negotiations would disclose the shallowness of many of 
their recent technological achievements. 
Strategic defense, however, was another matter. In short, 
Eisenhower upheld the commitment to continental air defense 
that had been made by Truman in 1950-52. Despite the tremen-
dous costs involved, "Ike" promptly affirmed his predecessor's 
decision to deploy the DEW line system, and helped to ensure 
funding for it until the Soviet Sputnik launch in October 1957 
killed much of its rational. But the prospect of a Soviet ballistic 
missile capability did not diminish Eisenhower's commitment to 
strategic defense. What happened was rather that its focus 
shifted from continental air defense against Soviet bombers, to 
the much more demanding task of ballistic missile defense 
(BMD). 
Research on a reliable BMD system had actually begun in 
earnest two years earlier, as an offshoot of the Army's surface-
to-air missile (SAM) program. In 1956, the Army's third 
generation SAM, the Nike-Zeus, had been selected by the 
Pentagon for the task of defending US strategic targets against 
attacking Soviet ballistic missiles - so-called "point defense" 
responsibility. On the same occasion, the more demanding task 
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of providing a reliable "area defense"- that is, defense of urban 
centers and other countervalue targets- was assigned to the Air 
Force. Since nobody had much faith in the possibility of area 
defense, this arrangement came as a serious setback for the Air 
Force and its prestigious SAM system, the Wizard. However, 
this was something the service managed to live with as long as 
the main national effort remained in the field of continental air 
defense against Soviet strategic bombers, a responsibility 
practically monopolized by the Air Defense Command. The 
Sputnik shock changed that equation, however: primarily 
because it decreased the importance of continental air defense, 
but also because it initiated a series of political decisions that 
were to channel vast R&D funds into work on ballistic missile 
defense. Moreover, the post-Sputnik hysteria in American 
society soon led to a strong political demand for an integrated 
BMD system, one which could provide both "point defense" and 
"area defense" capabilities. To its lasting dismay, the Air Force 
lost the ensuing inter-service battle with the Army over that new 
important assignment. In January 1958, Secretary of Defense 
Neil H. McElroy announced that the integrated national BMD 
effort would build upon the Army's Nike-Zeus missile.'" 
Further impetus for a more vigorous BMD program was 
provided by the Gaither Commission, a blue-ribbon panel which 
Eisenhower had appointed in early 1957 to study the require-
ments for civil defense. Its top-secret report Deterrence and 
Survival in the Nuclear Age, submitted to the President a month 
after the Sputnik launch, called for a strong national effort to 
protect both the American population and the SAC force against 
the emerging Soviet ICBM threat. Otherwise, the report 
concluded, both the US deterrent and survival were at risk. 129 
To a large extent, Eisenhower followed the Committee's 
recommendations for improving strategic bomber survivability. 
He was much less willing to follow its advice concerning civil 
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defense. For instance, he did not provide the recommended 
funding for a nation-wide fallout shelter program - a bit odd, 
perhaps, since it was precisely that topic he had asked the 
commission to address in the first place. But, as we have already 
seen, the reason was fairly simple: effective strategic defense 
was not affordable. Even if Eisenhower had a sincere interest in 
the subject and seriously felt that civil defense mattered for the 
overall strategic balance, he would not put the US economy in 
jeopardy to obtain what seemed to represent only a marginal 
improvement of the population's security. According to the 
Gaither Committee's assessment, the measures needed for a 
reliable and reasonable BMD system would cost no less than 
$25 billion over the first five years. The measures recommended 
for improving the offensive capabilities of the US strategic 
forces were, in comparison, estimated to cost $19 billion over 
the same period."" 
All in all, it appears that Eisenhower's commitment to strategic 
defense was less strong than his commitment to a balanced 
budget. It is also true that he gave much higher priority to the 
development of active "area defense" capabilities- which would 
improve the defense of military installations as well - than to 
passive or civil defense capabilities like blast and fallout 
shelters. Given his budgetary conservatism, his declared 
commitment to the strategy of massive destruction, and his 
sound assessment of the overall military balance (Eisenhower 
never accepted the idea that the Soviets were about to catch up 
with or surpass the United States in offensive nuclear 
capabilities), this was hardly a surprising choice. With a military 
doctrine and national security pol icy that for years had rested 
almost exclusively on the existence of an overwhelming US 
superiority in offensive nuclear forces, it would have made little 
sense not to make protection of those forces the principal 
assignment for the BMD program. 
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John F. Kennedy's victory in the 1960 presidential election did 
not result in anything more than a limited modification of this 
policy. However, given the new Administration's emphasis on 
flexibility, control, and damage limitation, it was only logical 
that it would upgrade the role of civil defense. The Adminis-
tration's experts, many of whom had been assisting the Gaither 
Commission, had figured out that even a modest civil defense 
program could help to save I 0-15 million American lives in the 
initial stage of a nuclear war. On the basis of that premise, 
funding for a national fallout shelter program figured high in the 
Defense Budgets of FY 1962 and FY 1963. To Kennedy this 
made sense also for other than humanitarian reasons - for 
instance, as a means of countering criticism that flexible 
response represented a lowering of the nuclear threshold. A 
more effective civil defense system, the Administration argued, 
would actually mean a hedge against a possible breakdown in 
deterrence since it indirectly decreased the offensive capability 
of the Soviet forces, particularly their countervalue capability. 
In tum, this could help to push Soviet war planners toward 
accepting and mirroring the new US counterforce/no cities 
strategy, thus enhancing strategic stability as well.'" 
Against this backdrop, it is perhaps surprising that the Kennedy 
Administration did so little to push deployment of the Nike-Zeus 
system, since that, too, was intended to mitigate the effects of 
a Soviet nuclear attack. However, McNamara never trusted the 
quality of that system. Generally skeptical about the notion of 
anti-ballistic missiles {ABMs), he was particularly negative to 
the Nike-Zeus, which he simply did not believe would work 
according to plan. His skepticism had several reasons - some 
were related to the operational limitations of the Nike-Zeus 
missiles; others to the extreme vulnerability of the early-warning 
radar network, and some to the system's ability to function in an 
intensely radioactive environment {a problem that American 
scientists were just starting to address). 
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For all these reasons, the inadequacy of the Nike-Zeus became 
a matter of increasing concern to McNamara in 1962-63. By 
then, the Army was getting ready to deploy the system and was 
pushing hard for his approval of a grandiose plan that would 
have resulted in the mass deployment of 7,000 missiles around 
27 US cities. In McNamara's view there was in this plan an 
unacceptable mismatch between economic costs and likely 
benefits in terms of national security. Having resisted the 
building pressure for an early deployment of a national BMD 
system from his first day in office, McNamara on these grounds 
canceled the Nike-Zeus program in early 1963. As a com-
pensation, he asked the Army to develop a more advanced 
system, termed "Nike-X", that could meet the strategic needs 
and technological challenges of the 1970s. 132 
The Kennedy years saw the signing of the Limited Test Ban 
Treaty of 1963,' and brought some more serious attention to the 
issue of strategic arms control. The Administration repeated its 
predecessor's propagandistic call for general and complete 
disarmament (GCD), and actually signed a joint statement of 
principle with the Soviet Union to that effect in September 
1961; it also demonstrated a new realism and sincerity in these 
issues. At home, Kennedy created the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, which in the 1970s would become the 
leading intra-government sponsor of arms control. At the level 
· The three original signatories of the L TB Treaty (the USA, the 
USSR, and the UK) committed themselves not to undertake any tests 
of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices in the atmosphere. Underground 
testing was not prohibited, however. The LTBT was never intended as 
an instrument of arms control; other motives, especially concerning the 
medical hazard caused by the atmospheric tests, were more crucial. 
Thus, whereas the Treaty was important from an environmental 
perspective, it had little effect on the military programs ofthe nuclear 
weapon states. 
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of diplomacy, Kennedy also used the McCloy-Zorin talks, which 
produced the joint GCD statement, to obtain official Soviet 
acceptance of the principle that GCD should be obtained in fully 
verifiable stages. This was an important development which, at 
least to the US side, helped to move strategic arms control from 
the realm of fantasy to the anteroom of high politics. 133 
However, while it appears that the Cuban missile crisis helped 
to make both Kennedy and Khrushchev more sympathetic to the 
notion of strategic arms control, 134 neither of them came up 
with any concrete or official proposals in this regard during their 
brief remaining time in power. The explanation is obvious. Even 
the frightening experience of the Cuban missile crisis could not 
annul the strong subjective interest both sides felt in completing 
their own ongoing strategic weapons programs. 
In sum, the pre-MAD period was characterized by an ambitious 
build-up in offensive forces complemented with a serious but 
relatively less ambitious attempt to neutralize the increasing 
threat posed by the offensive nuclear forces of the other side. 
The bedrock rationale for this "hitting high, fencing low" policy 
was that, in a situation of clear US superiority, a Soviet first 
strike would be a very unlikely event. Since the current US 
strategy for nuclear war was based on the assumption that the 
United States would strike the first blow- either to pre-empt an 
anticipated or to retaliate a preceding Soviet conventional attack 
on Western Europe or US overseas bases - there were good 
prospects that even a limited strategic defense capability could 
handle the second strike threat then posed by the surviving 
Soviet forces. Similarly, it was thought that there was little to 
gain from strategic arms control as long as the strategic balance 
was overwhelmingly favorable to the United States. Lacking 
today' s advanced means of verification, it simply seemed too 
hazardous to base the security of the United States on an 
unenforceable control regime rather than a superior nuclear 
deterrent. As we shall see, both of these assumptions were 
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radically altered by the advent of a secure Soviet retaliatory 
capability in the early 1960s. 
MAD: Many swords, few shields. Johnson, Nixon, and 
Ford 
In contrast to the modest revisions implemented by the Kennedy 
Administration, McNamara's retreat from flexible response and 
damage limitation in favor of assured destruction were to have 
significant and long-lasting implications for US arms control 
policy and BMD programs. In broad terms, the shift of doctrine 
in 1963-64 had two important implications: It eroded almost 
completely the rationale for ballistic missile defense, especially 
for protection of population centers; and it lessened the incentive 
for maintaining US superiority in strategic weapons. In due 
time, the two parallel processes would find their fulfillment, in 
the ABM Treaty and SALT I "Interim" Treaty, respectively. 
By 1963-64, McNamara had come to the conclusion that the 
intrinsic advantage of offense over defense in nuclear war made 
it extremely hard to justifY deployment of BMD systems. No 
system had yet been designed that could not be easily over-
whelmed by minor increases in the quantitative or qualitative 
capabilities of the enemy's offensive forces. As he explained to 
Johnson in a secret memorandum of December 1964, "our 
damage limiting problem is their assured destruction problem 
and our assured destruction problem is their damage limiting 
problem".JJ' The deployment of Soviet SLBMs was a case in 
point. Whereas the "layered defense" concept of the new Nike-X 
system appeared reasonably promising as long as it was meant 
to deal only with the threat of land-based ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), its operational tasks increased far beyond capacity as 
soon as the SLBM threat was brought into the equation, 
primarily because of the much shorter warning time. JJG 
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But there was more than technological constraints involved in 
this development. Equally important was McNamara's growing 
conviction that even a smoothly-functioning BMD system was a 
bad thing, because it would undermine the mutual hostage 
situation. The logic was that the development of an effective 
anti-ballistic missile system- by either the USA or the USSR-
would give rise to fears on the opposite side that its deterrent 
was about to be rendered useless and impotent. Under such 
destabilizing circumstances, McNamara argued, the inferior state 
could be tempted to opt for a pre-emptive first strike. Thus, 
rather than doing anything that could conceivably push Moscow 
in that direction, McNamara decided that the United States 
would be better served by helping to increase Soviet self-
confidence in the strategic sphere - not by letting the Soviet 
Union increase its relative offensive strength vis-a-vis the United 
States, but by negotiating a mutual agreement to renounce BMD 
development of any kind. In that way, each superpower would 
leave itself open to attack by the other. In McNamara's judg-
ment, this mutual increase in vulnerability had a positive side in 
that neither of the parties needed to fear that its retaliatory 
capability was at risk. The net result would be enhanced 
stability. 137 
Despite his reservations, McNamara could not halt the growing 
momentum in favor of BMD development. One reason was that 
he and his advisers were at odds with the military leadership as 
well as with a strong majority of the lawmakers at Capitol Hill. 
Caught between these contesting groups, President Johnson was 
unable to give his Secretary of Defense the support he needed 
to stand up against domestic-bureaucratic pressure. A second 
factor was that the Army had now managed to overcome many 
of the initial deficiencies of the Nike-X program, making it 
harder for McNamara to resist its deployment on technical 
grounds. Finally, McNamara's task was rendered practically 
impossible when, in November 1966, the Soviets started mass 
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deployment of the so-called Galosh ABM system around 
Moscow. Unimpressed by what he learned about the system 
from his intelligence sources, McNamara was confident that 
ongoing improvements in US offensive forces, such as the 
Poseidon and MIRV programs, would more than negate Soviet 
ABM efforts. But Galosh proved to be to America's BMD 
programs what Sputnik had been to her ICBM programs: a call 
for swift and bold decisions. Pressed by the JCS and the NSC, 
Johnson and McNamara soon agreed to start production of an 
updated version of the Nike-X system called Sentine/. 138 
The Sentinel decision was extraordinary in at least two ways. 
First of all, it included an invitation to Moscow to start 
negotiations on a complete ban on BMD systems, and commit-
ted the United States not to start deploying the system until 
either the Soviet Union had declined the offer to negotiate the 
system away or the negotiations had proved fruitless. Even more 
remarkable, McNamara had redefined the operational tasks of 
Sentinel so that they differed rather dramatically from those of 
the Nike-Zeus and Nike-X systems. Rather than trying to protect 
US cities against a Soviet ICBM attack - a task which 
McNamara found unfeasible as well as destabilizing- Sentinel 
was assigned two less demanding responsibilities. The first was 
to defend US "hard" targets against what McNamara called a 
"sophisticated threat" - that is, a massive attack by a Soviet 
ICBM force equipped with multiple warheads and electronic 
penetration aids. The second was to protect US "soft" targets, or 
cities, from the "primitive threat" of a small-scale ICBM attack 
by China."' 
Thus, on paper at least, Sentinel would provide both ''point 
defense" and "area defense". But since the latter assignment 
applied only to the remote possibility of nuclear war with China, 
it was clear t)Jat the Administration's ambitions in this regard 
were limited. Thus, even if McNamara apparently had made a 
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major concession to the military when he approved Sentinel 
production, he had redefined its operational tasks in such a way 
that it would not seriously undermine the emerging mutual 
hostage relationship with the Soviet Union. Even better, from 
McNamara's perspective, the Sentinel decision might be 
instrumental in bringing the Soviets around to accept his own 
position on the issue of ballistic missile defense. If Moscow 
could be persuaded to agree on a reciprocal ban on ABM 
systems, MAD would be immensely strengthened. 
The Johnson presidency saw a major shift also in US policy on 
strategic arms control. For the first time, Washington now 
signalled willingness to take part in bilateral negotiations with 
the Soviet Union. Johnson's first initiative on the matter - a 
proposal in 1964 to freeze all existing strategic force levels on 
both side - was hard to take seriously, though, designed as it 
was to preserve indefinitely an otherwise fast-eroding US 
superiority. But in the next two or three years, McNamara and 
his aides went through a Copernican revolution in their views on 
arms control. Rather than seeing it as a way to stop negative 
trends in the strategic competition with the Soviet Union, they 
began to acknowledge that the Soviets had legitimate security 
concerns, too, which had to be acknowledged in order to reach 
a mutually acceptable arms control agreement. Moreover, these 
decisionmakers were gradually coming to accept what is often 
called the "mechanistic" interpretation of the arms race- that is, 
the view that there is no one in particular to blame for it, and 
that the race was driven primarily by "technological momentum" 
and/or international "action-reaction" phenomena. 14° Finally, 
McNamara also took the position that, in a situation of 
impending strategic parity, strategic arms control could play a 
crucial role in minimizing the likelihood of nuclear war. 
Inspired by an important RAND study on the subject, the 
Secretary of Defense began to argue in favor of a comp-
rehensive bilateral arms control agreement with the Soviets, to 
73 
be based on the principles of parity and reciprocity. As men-
tioned, the Sentinel decision was used as an opportunity to 
invite Moscow to the negotiation table. 141 
The Soviet leadership accepted the invitation, and the joint 
decision to start anns control negotiations was announced in 
July !968, on the occasion of the signing of the Non-Pro-
liferation Treaty. However, the upcoming talks would soon be 
put on the back burner by two unforeseen developments: the 
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and the 
election of Richard Nixon as president two months later. 
In the long run, Nixon's victory in the 1968 presidential election 
probably meant a shortcut on the road toward a strategic arms 
control agreement - if not for other reasons, because his strong 
conservative credentials made him less vulnerable to charges 
from the political right that he was "soft on Communism". 
Initially, however, his Administration appeared less committed 
to arms control than its Democratic predecessor - primarily 
because Nixon began his first term by putting immense pressure 
on Congress to approve his funding requests for the Safeguard 
system (Nixon's name for Sentinel) and the just recently 
disclosed MIRV program. But it would be a mistake to see these 
appropriation requests as the starting shot for a comprehensive 
re-armament effort. What Nixon and his National Security 
Adviser Henry A. Kissinger wanted was not so much to increase 
US strategic capabilities as to strengthen the US position in the 
strategic arms control negotiations in which they, sooner rather 
than later, were determined to get involved. 142 
The first Nixon Administration's interest in strategic arms 
control was motivated by at least three factors: First of all, it 
saw strategic arms control as a means to reduce the inflationary 
growth in the defense budget (the obvious alternative - scaling 
down the US military involvement in Vietnam- was even more 
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controversial and uncertain). Secondly, they hoped to use the 
SALT process as a door-opener for more general detente. A 
third, and more concealed motive, was to arrest what they saw 
as various negative trends in the strategic relationship with the 
Soviet Union. As Kissinger explains in his memoirs: "We 
needed the agreement if we wanted to catch up in offensive 
weapons.'' 143 
Negotiations began in November 1969, and continued for the 
next two and half years. To the surprise of the US side, it soon 
became clear that Moscow was more ready to accept severe 
restrictions on ABM development than it was to accept 
limitations on its offensive weapons programs. Apparently, the 
Soviets were already frustrated about the technical shortcomings 
of the Galosh ABM system, and feared that, if deployed, the 
Safeguard would give the Americans a firm lead In the field of 
"point defense" (for economic and other reasons, Nixon had 
decided to drop the more exotic notion of area defense against 
a Chinese ICBM attack). As far as offensive weapons systems 
were concerned, the situation was almost the opposite: Here, 
trends were either going Moscow's way, and should therefore be 
allowed to continue unchecked, or the United States enjoyed a 
qualitative lead which the Soviets needed time to catch up with, 
as in the sphere of multiple independent re-entry vehicles 
(MIRV). 144 
The end result was the SALT 1 agreement of May 1972, which 
consisted of two separate parts: A treaty of "unlimited duration" 
banning extensive ABM deployment, and a so-called "Interim 
Agreement" of five year duration which essentially froze the 
offensive strategic arsenals of both superpowers at their existing 
levels. When ratified by the US Senate in October 1972, the 














The greater Soviet numbers in ICBM and SLBM launchers 
reflected numerical leads in these categories at the time of the 
signing of the Treaty. Even among those Senators who sup-
ported the Treaty, these asymmetries caused a lot of criticism. 
As a result, the Senate passed a resolution in the fall of 1972 -
sponsored by Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (Dem., W A) -
which prohibited ratification of any follow-up SALT agreement 
unless it embodied the principle of "essential equivalence" .145 
Despite these negative contemporary assessments, it is clear that 
the Interim Agreement also had some features rather appealing 
to the United States. For one thing, it left out strategic bombers 
- a category in which the United States still held a clear 
superiority. Moreover, it put no restrictions on the number of 
warheads. Since the Americans at this time were far ahead in 
MIRV technology, this meant that they could increase their 
already substantial lead in number of deliverable warheads 
·One year later, in 1973, the parties modified the agreement so that each side 
would be allowed to retain only a single site located either around its capital 
or at an ICBM site. The USA chose to place its only Safeguard network 
around the Grand Forks Minuteman site in North Dakota, but the deployment 
was never completed . 
.. The Soviet Union had to remove several Galosh units in order to comply 
with this ceiling, maintaining only one area defense system around Moscow 
and one point defense system close to an ICBM site halfway between the 
capital and Leningrad. 
••• The actual Soviet strength at the time of signing was 740 SLBM launchers 
on 56 submarines. However, claiming to have 210 additional SLBM launchers 
on six submarines under construction, the Soviets were allowed to deploy these 
as well. As a compensation, the United States was permitted to trade 54 
outmoded Titan ICBMs for a similar number of modem SLBMs. 
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simply by MIRVing those SLBMs and JCBMs allowed to the 
United States under the Treaty. Finally, whereas the Treaty put 
no limitations on ongoing or planned US modernization 
programs, it did prohibit the Soviets from increasing the number 
of launchers for heavy JCBMs, which at that time counted 3 08 
units. This was an important concession, since the heavy ICBM 
(the SS-9 and its successor SS-18) was considered the most 
threatening and potentially destabilizing of all Soviet weapons 
systems. 146 
Categorizing the first Nixon Administration's policies on arms 
control and missile defense is difficult. On the one hand, there 
were many similarities between these policies and those of the 
Johnson Administration- among other things, the ABM Treaty 
and the willingness to accept quantitative limits on US offensive 
capabilities were both in line with McNamara's objectives in 
1967-68, and thus fully compatible with MAD. In his memoirs, 
Nixon confirmed this when writing that the principal effect of 
the ABM Treaty was "to make permanent the concept of 
deterrence through 'mutual terror"'. 147 The same goes for 
Nixon's transformation from an advocate of re-establishing US 
strategic superiority, a position he held as late as in the 1968 
presidential campaign, to his adoption shortly afterwards of the 
notion of strategic parity - or sufficiency, as the reborn "MAD-
vocate" preferred to call it. 148 Kissinger's turnabout was no 
Jess remarkable. Starting out as a believer in "meaningful 
superiority", he had begun, since the mid-1950s, to realize that 
at some point in the not-too-distant future, "superiority was 
going to become next to impossible to obtain". Technological 
developments would help to lead the superpowers towards "a 
kind of parity which would make absolute war impossible", he 
later stated. 149 Using another phrase that could have been 
borrowed from McNamara's MAD vocabulary, he defended the 
SALT I Treaty with the argument that it represented "a major 
contribution to strategic stability". " 0 By the time of the 
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Vladivostok summit, he had little left for the notion of strategic 
superiority. "What do you do with superiority?", he wondered. 
"What does it mean? What value is it?" 151 
In apparent contradiction to all this, the retrospective accounts 
of both Kissinger and Nixon have emphasized how difficult the 
US strategic position was in the early 1970s. Both men claim 
that the ABM and SALT I Treaties were necessary conditions 
for all subsequent US American attempts at restoring a more 
favorable balance. However that might be, this explanation is at 
least consistent with the overall trend in the first Nixon 
Administration's modernization programs, which by 1972 
showed clear signs of moving away from the dominant MAD 
philosophy of the late 1960s towards the counterforce-escalation 
control posture soon to be epitomized by the Schlesinger 
Doctrine. 
The safest conclusion is probably that the first Nixon Adminis-
tration represented a transition period. Both MAD and post-
MAD concepts were operating side by side, occasionally 
resulting in a self-contradictory policy. 
The MAD decade was definitely coming to an end by 1973-74, 
however. As we have seen, the beginning of Schlesinger's 
tenure as Secretary of Defense marked a crucial departure from 
the past, especially in nuclear doctrine and employment policies. 
These changes had implications also for US arms control policy 
in the same period. Most importantly, perhaps, the gap between 
the military services, the JCS, and the Department of Defense on 
the one hand, and the NSC and the State Department on the 
other, increased dramatically on several issues highly relevant 
for negotiations on the follow-up agreement to SALT I. 
Representatives of the military generally insisted either on 
avoiding restrictions on US offensive weapons systems that their 
MAD-prone civilian colleagues were ready to regulate, or on 
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imposing much harsher restrictions on offensive Soviet systems 
than Kissinger and his followers thought necessary or ob-
tainable. Cases in point are the disagreements over the cruise 
missile (basically a US asset) and the Soviet heavy missiles. 
Schlesinger and the US military wanted as few restrictions on 
the cruise missile as possible, but were pushing hard for 
reductions in the SS-9 and SS-18 force. Conversely, Kissinger 
was more willing to compromise on the cruise missile, and to 
tolerate no better than a freeze in the number of heavy missiles. 
The problem of how to categorize the Soviet Backfire bomber-
as a medium range or strategic aircraft - splitted the US side 
roughly along the same line of division, with Kissinger willing 
to accept the first alternative and the JCS insisting on the 
second. 152 
The Vladivostok Agreement, signed by President Ford and 
General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Leonid 
Brezhnev in November 1974, reflected these controversies. 
Trying to satisfY the Senate's call for symmetrical parity, the 
Agreement defined a set of aggregate strategic force limits that 
were to apply equally to the strategic forces of either side. The 
superpowers were allowed to deploy a total of 2,400 strategic 
launchers each. That figure included ICBMs, SLBMs as well as 
strategic bombers (one bomber= one launcher), but it was up to 
each country to determine the exact numerical distribution 
among the three legs of the triad. In addition, the Agreement put 
a sub-limit on MIRVed missiles, restricting that category to 
I ,320 for each side. 153 The Soviets were allowed to maintain 
their existing 308 heavy missiles, but could not increase that 
number. Cruise missiles and the Backfire were not mentioned in 
the Agreement, with a tacit understanding that these weapons 
systems would be dealt with in a follow-up treaty. 
Kissinger had his way on the Backfire and heavy missiles, but 
had to yield to Schlesinger on the cruise missile. Thus, it is 
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probably correct to see the Vladivostok Agreement as a double 
compromise - one between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, another between the contesting advocates of MAD versus 
escalation control within the US government. As far as strategic 
anns control and BMD were concerned, the Ford presidency 
thus appears as the last stage in the transition period between 
MAD and post-MAD policies. In these two areas, US policy 
was still dominated by MAD, but increasingly influenced also 
by the concepts of the Schlesinger Doctrine. 
Summing up, then, the MAD decade was characterized by 
general consensus among political and military decisionmakers 
that the national security of the United States had become 
inseparably linked to the preservation of its mutual hostage 
relationship with the Soviet Union. To preserve MAD, two 
things were required: First of all, both parties had to refrain 
from taking defensive actions that, intentionally or unin-
tentionally, could put the opponent's retaliatory capabilities at 
risk. Secondly, even if the race in offensive strategic weapons 
should be halted and brought under control so as to lessen the 
danger of accidental war and destabilizing technological 
developments, both sides also needed to maintain enough 
offensive forces to ensure that their capability to impose 
intolerable damage upon each other could not be nullified by a 
disarming counterforce first strike. In tenns of arms control and 
strategic defense, the "many swords, few shields" policy of the 
late 1960s and early 1970s manifested itself in the ABM Treaty 
and the SALT I "Interim" Agreement, which basically froze the 
strategic forces at their current levels without attempting to 
reduce the offensive power of either side. The rationale of this 
policy was built on the assumption that the "objective" reality of 
the mutual hostage situation would impose itself on the Soviet 
leaders and make them accept the logic of assured destruction. 
When domestic critics of MAD began to question this 
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assumption, both the SALT process and the ABM Treaty 
became hotly disputed topics in the United States. 
Post-MAD: Earthly fears, heavenly shelters. Carter, 
Reagan, and Bush 
The move away from MAD was accelerated under President 
Jimmy Carter; but again, with one significant exception, the 
development was less explicit and radical in arms control and 
BMD than in other areas of US nuclear policy. It would be up 
to Carter's Republican successor, Ronald Reagan, to adopt 
strong anti-MAD positions also in these two spheres. As we 
shall see, however, the seeds of many of these positions had 
been sown during the Carter years. In historical perspective, it 
is clear that the similarities between the arms control and BMD 
policies of the Carter and the Reagan-Bush Administrations were 
numerous, and generally more striking than the differences. 
In what ways were their policies alike? 
One obvious similarity was their common quest for compre-
hensive reductions in the offensive strategic forces of both sides. 
The rationale behind this position was very simple. According 
to the conservative arms control school so influential in the late 
1970s, the SALT I Treaty and the Vladivostok Agreement had 
only helped to stabilize the arms race and reduce some of the 
political tensions between the contesting parties. But enhancing 
what experts call arms race stability and political stability were 
not enough. Indeed, such stability could be dangerous for the 
West unless supplemented with so-called first-strike or crisis 
stability - that is, unless the arms control process led to 
agreements that would reduce the incentive on either side for 
initiating a nuclear war, even in times of acute international 
crisis. As seen by these experts, first-strike stability could most 
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effectively be obtained by adopting measures that would deprive 
both superpowers of their most potent first-strike weapons: 
without these, the temptation to opt for pre-emption or a 
preventive first strike would be reduced to a minimum. Thus, it 
became a standing goal for the conservative arms control experts 
to impose substantial reductions in the first-strike capabilities of 
the Soviet Union, particularly its heavy missiles. 154 
This was exactly what Carter hoped to obtain with his con-
troversial "deep cuts" proposal of March 1977. During the 
presidential campaign of 1976, Carter had made it clear that he 
wished to reach an early SALT 2 treaty based on the principles 
of the Vladivostok Agreement- essentially a freeze on existing 
aggregate force levels - and then move quickly on to what he 
referred to as real arms reduclions. He confirmed this position 
as late as in February 1977, both publicly and in private 
communications with Brezhnev. '" However, for reasons that 
are still far from clear, Carter suddenly changed his mind on the 
issue, deciding instead to put the Vladivostok accord aside and 
push for substantial reductions in offensive strategic forces. 
By all indications, the resulting "deep cuts" proposal of March 
1977 was a result of three influences. The most important, of 
course, was Carter's strong personal qualms about nuclear 
weapons, and his correspondingly high ambitions concerning 
dramatic reductions in nuclear forces. 
Another critical influence was represented by Senator Jackson, 
with whom Carter at first had a close relationship. As the 
sponsor of the "essential equivalence" amendment to the bill that 
ratified the SALT I Treaty, Senator Jackson was undoubtedly 
the most influential congressional spokesman for the con-
servative arms control school. In late 1976, he and his principal 
military adviser, Richard Perle, had helped to organize the 
Committee on the Present Danger, which immediately became 
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the leading forum for conservative criticism of MAD-inspired 
defense and arms control policies. Sharing many of Jackson's 
views, and hoping to win the support of his conservative 
constituencies, Carter was eager to recruit Jackson as a major 
partisan of the Administration's defense policies. He could 
hardly hope to achieve that, however, unless he addressed the 
problem which Jackson and his colleagues in the Committee on 
the Present Danger referred to as "the window of opportunity" -
the alleged vulnerability of the US Minuteman force to a 
disarming Soviet first strike. The only way to close that 
window, they argued, was by making the Soviets reduce their 
counterforce capabilities: in plain English that meant to make 
them accept deep cuts in their arsenal of heavy missiles. In a 
30-page memorandum to the President, Perle and Jackson put 
forward an impressive set of arguments in favor of abandoning 
the Vladivostok Agreement in favor of deep cuts - most of 
which Carter appears to have accepted.'" 
And lastly, deep cuts were supported by the US military and 
important segments of the national security bureaucracy in 
Washington. The JCS liked the proposal chiefly because it 
addressed what they, for years, had regarded as the major threat 
to US security, namely the Soviet Union's growing superiority 
in land-based ballistic missiles. But they may also have cal-
culated that the proposal would be rejected by the Soviets, and 
that this would cause a negotiations impasse which could be 
used to improve the US strategic position. In a similar way, 
National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and his staff saw 
deep cuts as a rational position because it would lead either to 
an arms control agreement favorable to the United States, or to 
a breakdown in the negotiations that would prove to the 
American people that the Soviets were not seriously interested 
in arms control.'" 
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The "deep cuts" proposal of March 1977 called for a sharp 
reduction in aggregate strategic force levels - down from 2,400 
launchers on each side in the Vladivostok Agreement to 
something in the range of I ,800-2,000. Within this total, there 
would be two sub-ceilings of 550 MIRVed ICBMs and 550-650 
MIRVed SLBMs. Moreover, the Soviets would have to reduce 
their heavy missile force from 308 to !50 units. They would 
also have to forego any plans for converting the Backfire into 
a full-fledged strategic bomber. As a compensation, the United 
States suggested a ban on all new ICBMs - a provision that 
would kill its own MX program - and a 2,500 km across-the-
board limit on cruise missiles. The latter concession was easy to 
offer, since none of the services had any plans of developing a 
cruise missile with range longer than that. Cancelling the MX 
program was a much bolder proposal, but as long as the Soviets 
would have to pay for it by destroying half of their heavy 
missiles, it seemed a good bargain.'" 
Historians will probably never agree on how to characterize the 
"deep cuts" proposal: whether it was fair, visionary, naive, 
unrealistic, one-sided, insincere, or simply years ahead of its 
time. At any rate, the Soviets flatly rejected it, telling Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance that there would be no SALT 2 agreement 
unless it could be built directly on the Vladivostok accord. After 
considering this ultimatum for a month or two, the Americans 
finally gave in. In late May 1977, the two sides decided to get 
the SALT 2 negotiations back on track again. For two more 
years, they wrestled with the problem, only to end up with an 
agreement that bore striking similarities to the Vladivostok deal. 
Signed by Carter and Brezhnev in June I 979, the SALT 2 
Agreement imposed an equal overall ceiling of 2,250 strategic 
delivery systems for both parties, including a sub limit of I ,320 
on the combined number of MIRVed ICBMS, SLBMs, and 
ALCM-carrying strategic bombers (the sum ofMIRVed lCMBs 
and SLBMs not to exceed 1,200). Each side could deploy a 
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maximum of 820 MIRVed ICBMs, none of which should be 
emplaced on mobile launchers. The Soviet Union maintained its 
308 heavy missiles, whereas the United States was allowed to 
deploy ALCMs within the 2,500 km range. As for ground- and 
sea-based cruise missiles, their maximum range was set to 600 
km.J59 
The SALT 2 Agreement was never ratified by the US Senate, 
but its provisions were faithfully adhered to by both the Soviet 
Union and the United States well into the second Reagan 
Administration. All the same, it is possible to argue that the 
agreement had a less profound and lasting influence on US 
nuclear policy than the abortive "deep cuts" proposal of March 
1977. This conclusion rests on the fact that the strategic arms 
agreements negotiated by the Reagan and Bush Administrations 
- the START I Agreement of July 1991 and the START 2 
Agreement of January 1993 - were much more in line with the 
spirit of the "deep cuts" proposal than the SALT 2 
Agreement.'" Not only did the two START agreements 
impose deep cuts of their own, leading to successive reductions 
in the total number of strategic warheads on each side by 
respectively 30 and 75% (down from 12,500 to 3,500 missile 
warheads and ALCMs each), and a cut in the aggregate number 
of strategic delivery vehicles to no more than I ,600 (a 30% 
reduction from the SALT 21imit). They also resembled Carter's 
"deep cuts" proposal in insisting on radical reductions in the 
number of Soviet heavy missiles. In 1991, after eight years of 
hard bargaining, Moscow finally agreed to reduce the SS-18 
force by 50% (START 1). Eighteen months later, the START 
2 Agreement committed Russia - which in the meantime had 
replaced the Soviet Union at the negotiation table - to give up 
even the remaining !54 SS-18s over a ten-year period. Finally, 
as a third similarity, the Reagan-Bush Administrations re-started 
and finished the process of reducing the numbers of MIRVed 
ICBMs which Carter, without success, had begun in 1977. 
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According to START 2, the parties must reduce the number of 
warheads on MIRVed ICBMsto 1,200 by the year 2000 (Russia 
would be left with approximately 100-120 MIRVed missiles 
carrying 6-10 warheads each), and then move on to eliminate 
this category of weapons completely within the next three 
years. 161 
From a US perspective, each of these three developments -
reductions in the number of warheads and delivery vehicles, in 
the number of MIRVed ICBMs, and in the number of Soviet 
heavy missiles- served the same over-all purpose of helping to 
close the alleged "window of opportunity" that the Soviets had 
acquired during, or as a result of, the MAD decade. The Carter, 
Reagan, and Bush years, therefore, marked a significant shift of 
focus for US arms control negotiators, away from arms control 
stability and political stability, and towards the more ambitious 
goal of first-strike stability. 
In addition to the quest for comprehensive reductions in the 
offensive strategic forces of both sides, and the increased first-
strike stability resulting from these reductions, the policies of the 
Carter-Reagan-Bush Administrations resembled each other also 
in the priority they al/ached to the task of strategic defense. 
Under Carter, this task was contemplated strictly within the 
limits of the ABM Treaty, with the focus mainly on passive 
defense measures like fallout and blast shelters. But the imp-
lications were much wider than that. As General William Odom, 
who served as Brzezinski's military adviser in the NSC, later 
told the author, "once you say, as we did in PD-41, that civil 
defense, like any type of strategic defense, is part of the overall 
strategic balance - once you say that, you implicitly have 
abandoned MAD as a your guiding principle in life" .162 
The abandoning of MAD and increasing emphasis on defense 
manifested themselves in other ways as well. For instance, the 
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attention and resources spent on finding a secure basing mode 
for the MX demonstrated a radically increased concern about US 
vulnerability to Soviet attack; indeed, the "multiple protective 
shelter" (MPS) basing mode preferred by the Carter Adminis-
tration can be seen as an attempt to obtain by passive defense 
measures what the ABM Treaty made it impossible to obtain by 
active defense. Secondly, the late 1970s saw the first attempts 
at redirecting US military-civilian research programs towards 
socalled "exotic" or "futuristic" technologies, such as directed-
beams weapons, which many experts were beginning to see as 
a promising new avenue in the search for an effective BMD 
system. 163 
It was this latter effort that was lifted to international fame by 
President Reagan's "Star Wars" speech on 23 March I 983. '" 
By then, it had long since become clear that the Reagan 
Administration would put unprecedented emphasis on active 
defense. In its first two years, the Administration had concen-
trated its efforts on "point defense" systems that could enhance 
the security of hardened strategic targets, in particular the 
Minuteman silos then contemplated for the MX. Then, in early 
1983, Reagan suddenly decided to broaden the scope of 
American BMD research to include the "ultimate goal of 
eliminating the threat posed by nuclear ballistic missiles" -
words commonly interpreted as a call for developing a fool-
proof defense of US cities and population centers."' At the 
outset, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SOl) was supposed to be 
carried out "in a manner consistent with [the US] obligations 
under the ABM Treaty".'" But that commitment faded over 
the next two or three years, with governmental officials speaking 
all the more freely about the possibility of breaking out of the 
ABM Treaty, if that were necessary to carry out the SDI 
program. Trying to prepare the US public for such a break-out, 
the Reagan Administration alternated between issuing charges 
that the Soviet Union had been violating the Treaty for 
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years, 167 and claiming that the ABM Treaty had never been 
intended to ban research on space-based area-defense systems 
of the kind considered under the program.'" It was wrong, 
therefore, to perceive the SDI program in its current phase as a 
violation of the Treaty. Finally, Caspar Weinberger never missed 
an opportunity to point out that, since the ABM Treaty also 
called for early reductions in offensive strategic weapons, and 
since the Soviets so far had rejected all US proposals aimed at 
that goal, no one had any right to complain if the United States 
began to prepare defensive counter-measures against the 
excessive offensive forces of the Soviet Union. 169 
After the first year of euphoria, Reagan's SDI advisers became 
increasingly cautious in their assessment of the program. 
Accordingly, the President's secret directives on the matter, such 
as the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-119 of 6 
January !984, began to stress the importance of organizing a 
series of well-structured, long-term R&D programs, rather than 
a crash program with short-term deployment in mind. In 
accordance with that decision, the Administration set up a 
national Strategic Defense Initiative Organization within the 
Department of Defense, which soon had at its disposal a $26 
billion annual R&D effort within and outside the military 
services. 170 
Even these huge investments could not save the program, 
however. By the time Reagan left office, the momentum behind 
the SOl program had been lost; in part because of the enormous 
costs and technological difficulties involved, in part also because 
the rapidly improving US-Soviet relations after Mikhael 
Gorbachev's rise to power had relieved much of the fear of a 
Soviet first strike that had underpinned the program in its initial 
stages. Its original rationale was further weakened in the course 
of the Bush Administration, when the START I and 2 
Agreements virtually imposed that shift from an offense-
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dominated to a defense-dominated world which Reagan had 
called for in his "Star Wars" speech. When the first US post-
Cold War Administration took office in January 1993, it needed 
less than six months to revoke the "broad" interpretation of the 
ABM Treaty offered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. 
In contrast to his Republican predecessors, who had read the 
Treaty to permit development and testing of space-based ABM 
systems, President Bill Clinton made it clear that he considered 
the SDI to represent a violation of the letter and spirit of the 
Treaty, and committed himself to terminating the program.'" 
The post-MAD phase of the Cold War in the USA was characte-
rized by strong public fears of nuclear war; not since the early 
I 960s had there been such mass demonstrations of grassroots 
anxiety in Western societies as during the first term of the 
Reagan presidency. Reagan himself tried to alleviate these very 
earthly fears of a nuclear Armageddon by offering the vision of 
a heavenly shelter against the Soviet threat. That the vision 
collapsed - and probably never was scientifically sound in the 
first place - may be less important than the fact that it was 
presented and pursued with such remarkable determination. In 
historical perspective, SDI may well stand as a symbol of US 
resurgence in the post-MAD period of the Cold War. In their 
quest for marginal superiority, US policymakers from Carter to 
Bush pressed hard for deep cuts in those categories of offensive 
forces that were considered the most threatening to the United 
States, notably the Soviet heavy and mobile ICBMs, thereby 
hoping to enhance first- strike and crisis stability. They also 
looked for ways and technologies that could help to change the 
balance between strategic offense and defense in favor of the 
latter, with Reagan's "Star Wars" program as the ultimate proof 
of a failed, or at least premature, effort. At any rate, when 
supplemented with strong efforts in C' development, stealth 
technologies, and increased counterforce capability for both the 
sea- and ground-based legs of the strategic triad, the arms 
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control and strategic defense policies of the last three Cold War 
administrations were instrumental in changing the strategic 
balance once again in the favor of the United States. If only on 
the margin, that shift may very well have played a significant 
role for the peaceful ending of the Cold War. After all, if 
Wholstetter was right and the US-Soviet balance of terror was 
indeed a "delicate" one, then such margins were really the most 
central point. 
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Conclusion: A continuous search for superiority 
The key argument of this study is that US nuclear policy 
throughout the Cold War was characterized by a quest for 
superiority, and that this Leitmotif is essential to understanding 
how US doctrine, AED policies, arms control positions, and 
strategic defense programs evolved in the dynamic strategic 
environment of that period. However, "superiority" meant 
different things at different times, and was intended to serve 
slightly different goals. It was also sought in different areas of 
capability, which reflected shifting technological opportunities 
and shifting Soviet threats. 
Beginning with the crucial question of goals, we have seen that 
when the first discussions started on how the US monopoly in 
nuclear weapons could serve US national interests, the military 
and political leaders of the Truman Administration singled out 
three over-riding goals or functions: to deter Soviet aggression, 
to secure a rapid and decisive victory in case of war, and to 
bolster West European morale despite local Soviet superiority in 
conventional forces. How did each of these goals fare in the 
next four-and-half decades? 
Nothing in the primary and secondary sources consulted for this 
study suggests any significant changes concerning the first and 
principal goal. Deterrence remained the chief objective of US 
nuclear policy throughout the Cold War; an unswerving constant 
against which all other policy modifications and doctrinal 
changes have to be measured. The only time when anyone 
seriously challenged the primacy of deterrence was in the early 
and mid 1950s, when some military leaders, primarily from the 
SAC headquarters, raised the possibility of preventive war. What 
triggered their inquiries were several top-secret reports prepared 
by the NSC and various military agencies in 1952-53, 
identifYing passive and active strategic defense as "the Achilles 
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heel of [US] national security" .172 Whereas the State 
Department, the Pentagon, the JCS, and the President all reacted 
to these reports by putting more emphasis on programs that 
could enhance the strategic defense capabilities of the United 
States, and make it harder for Soviet bombers to strike against 
US targets, a small minority of officers recommended a radically 
different solution. Arguing that by 1954-1955 the USA would 
become vulnerable to a surprise atomic attack by Soviet forces 
and that strategic defense could never be sufficiently effective 
under such circumstances, they concluded that the only way to 
ensure that US nuclear power would be able to influence the 
outcome of a future Soviet-American war was by striking first, 
before a single Soviet strategic bomber had left the ground. This 
view never won general acceptance, however, even though 
Eisenhower as late as March 1959 wondered aloud whether it 
would not be in the US interest to "start fighting now" instead 
of "waiting to go quietly down the drain". m When in a more 
serious mood, Eisenhower always stressed that preventive war 
would both violate national tradition and be practically impossi-
ble to execute by a democratic state, 174 a position apparently 
shared by the vast majority of his military and political 
advisers. 175 By early 1955, the Eisenhower Administration 
revised its basic national security policy in light of the emer-
gence of a Soviet "net capability to strike a crippling blow at the 
United States". Even with this radical change in the strategic 
environment, the Administration confirmed the principal 
objective of US nuclear policy as it had been defined by its 
predecessor in 1946-48, during the time of US monopoly: the 
central aim was still "to deter the Communists from use of their 
military power". 176 None of Eisenhower's successors seem 
ever to have departed from that overriding goal. 
The situation is less clear with regard to the second and third 
objectives. All US administrations seem to have shared the 
position of the Eisenhower Administration that, in addition to 
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deterring Soviet aggression, it was a major aim of the US 
strategic forces to keep the nation prepared to "cope successfully 
with general war" should it ever be forced upon the United 
States."' Likewise, none of their successors seem seriously to 
have questioned the conclusion of the Truman and Eisenhower 
Administrations, that the strength of the US strategic and other 
nuclear forces could help, in a crucial way, "in maintaining the 
morale and will of the free world to resist aggression" .m 
However, despite general consensus about the content of these 
goals, there were important nuances in how successive adminis-
trations set about to obtaining them. 
In the pre-MAD era, US authorities clearly hoped for a swift 
and decisive military victory should there be a breakdown in 
central or extended deterrence. At the outset of the Cold War, 
American decisionmakers hoped that its nuclear monopoly 
would ensure a US victory regardless of how and where war 
broke out. By 1950, that optimism was gone, and as Soviet 
offensive capabilities continued to grow - adding thermonuclear 
bombs, long-range bombers, and ballistic missiles to an already 
impressive conventional and nuclear arsenal - it became 
increasingly clear that the outcome of a conflict would be 
decided by the timing of the US nuclear offensive. Having 
rejected the notion of preventive war, the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration never ruled out the possibility of nuclear pre-emption, 
however: With a recognized Soviet capability to destroy 
American cities and other vital assets with its offensive nuclear 
forces, preemption was really the only realistic way in which the 
United States could fulfill its "determination to prevail if general 
war eventuates". 179 As Eisenhower himself interpreted the 
• Nuclear "preemption" refers to a massive nuclear first strike based on solid 
evidence of an imminent Soviet attack. In contemporary discourse, the same 
phenomenon is now often referred to as a "launch-on-warning" strategy. 
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ruling ofNSC 5602/1 on this matter, "any war in which Russian 
troops were involved directly against United States forces" 
would be general war, and in any such situation he would order 
SAC in the air "as soon as he found out that Russian troops 
were on the move." When Army Chief of Staff, General Taylor, 
protested that this launch-on-warning strategy would be suicidal 
in a situation of mutual deterrence, the President brushed him 
aside, lecturing that in case of any hostile Soviet action, 
immediate and massive retaliation would be the "key to 
surviva1". 180 Since the scenario discussed was a conventional 
Soviet attack on US forward-based forces, "retaliation" in this 
case was simply another word for "pre-emption". 
The Kennedy Administration fully shared the objective of US 
victory should deterrence fail and general war break out. 
However, with the undeniable threat of thermonuclear-capable 
Soviet ICBMs, victory - in any meaningful interpretation of the 
word - could be achieved only if the fighting were kept at levels 
below a cataclysmic full-spectrum employment of nuclear 
forces. More specifically, it was hoped that a forceful demons-
tration of clear US superiority at all levels of limited nuclear 
war-fighting would persuade the Soviet leadership to surrender, 
or at least to end the fighting on terms favorable to the United 
States. Thus, Flexible Response was intended not only to bolster 
deterrence, but also to provide guidance for how the United 
States and its allies could prevail in a general war against an 
enemy that was considered inferior, but still capable of inflicting 
intolerable damage upon the Western world. 
More than anything else, it was the collapse of the latter 
aspiration that paved the way for Assured Destruction. What 
happened was basically that McNamara and his advisers lost 
faith in the possibility of winning a nuclear war. This had to do 
partly with the growth of Soviet offensive capabilities, and 
partly with the lack of defensive countermeasures. The late 
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I 950s and early I 960s were not so much a matter of alleged 
bomber or missile gaps, as of a general, and rapidly widening 
"technology gap" between strategic offense and defense. US 
authorities responded to the resulting mutual hostage situation by 
putting even more emphasis on avoiding nuclear war. The 
means applied were revolutionary in the sense that they, in 
various ways, transcended the traditional instruments of deter-
rence. Rather than trying to deter Soviet aggression exclusively 
by means of superior strategic forces, the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations sought to compensate for the loss of meaningful 
superiority through arms control and other bilateral agreements 
that they hoped would increase arms race stability and political 
stability, thus making a general war with the Soviet Union 
increasingly unlikely. The flip side of all this was that fewer 
efforts were being made at contemplating ways of assuring US 
victory, should this "deterrence-plus" stability break down. 
Hence the notion discussed above, of strategy hitting a dead end 
under MAD. 
It would be mistaken to assume that the revival of strategy in 
the mid-1970s meant that US policymakers had regained the 
confidence in victory in a general war that had been so 
characteristic of the pre-MAD era. Quite the opposite, there 
appears to have been no disagreement about the utterly des-
tructive consequences of such a war for the United States and its 
allies. Neither did the spokesmen of the Ford, Carter, Reagan 
and Bush Administrations sound particularly optimistic about the 
possibility of limited nuclear conflict - Harold Brown, in 
particular, stressed that he doubted whether it would be possible 
to keep even the most limited exchanges from escalating into an 
all-out nuclear war."' What happened was rather that, with the 
continued quantitative and qualitative growth in Soviet strategic 
power in the I 970s and early I 980s, US decisionmakers were 
reminded of Wholstetter's earlier waming that the balance of 
terror is not automatic, but delicate. 
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To James R. Schlesinger, this delicacy was first of all connected 
with the credibility of the US extended deterrent. Because of the 
essential equivalence in central strategic forces, he never feared 
a large-scale Soviet first strike against the United States; on this 
point, he had no quarrel with McNamara. What he worried 
about, though, was that because of that parity, Moscow could 
for the first time be tempted to take aggressive action against 
Western Europe or other contested areas of vital importance to 
the United States, calculating that the possibility of a massive 
Soviet nuclear response would so unnerve Washington that it 
would back away from taking serious military counter-measures. 
The major objective of the Schlesinger Doctrine was to convince 
the Soviet leadership that there existed no such "window of 
opportunity" in Western Europe in the shadow of MAD. Rather 
than putting the US President in a situation in which he might 
have to choose between general war or local surrender, 
Schlesinger wanted to present the opposite side with the option 
of a localized American nuclear response to its local acts of 
aggression. Hence, the doctrine's emphasis on developing C3 
and tactical nuclear weapons capabilities to enforce favorable 
outcomes of limited nuclear conflicts. In this respect, the 
Schlesinger Doctrine also represented a revival of the third 
general goal of US nuclear policy: to bolster Western morale in 
the face of local Soviet superiority.'" 
What happened in the late 1970s and early 1980s was primarily 
that Soviet offensive capabilities continued to grow, in absolute 
as well as relative terms. The deployment of the SS-20, which 
began in 1977, nullified whatever there was left of Western 
nuclear superiority in the European theater, thereby adding 
further weight to the conventional advantages already held by 
the Warsaw Pact. In the strategic realm, the introduction of 
MIRVable third-generation Soviet ICBMs, and the SS-18 
"heavy" missile in particular, created fears among American 
analysts and politicians that the US Minuteman force was 
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serious at risk. No doubt, the remote but theoretical possibility 
of a Soviet "out-of-the-blue" first strike against the US ICBM 
silos was well exploited of by the military services and other 
organizations with a stake in US defense production. However, 
this fact should not allow us to dismiss the sincerity of those 
who feared the political and military consequences of a shift in 
the strategic balance, away from essential equivalence and 
toward partial Soviet superiority. 
According to influential conservative analysts at the time, the 
"window of opportunity" due to the new Soviet superiority in 
land-based ballistic missiles would, if unchecked, eventually 
allow the Soviets to dictate the outcome of almost any bilateral 
or international conflict. According to this logic, the Schlesinger 
Doctrine had done no more than to supply the United States 
with a handful of limited nuclear options, each of which it was 
hoped would persuade Moscow to stop the fighting in fear of 
further escalation. But what if the Soviet leaders, with the 
looming threat of the SS-I8s behind their back, simply upped 
the ante and struck back? In the judgement of Colin S. Gray and 
Keith Payne, the risk would then be that the United States -
having no other credible counter-option than the massive and 
suicidal first strike - would succumb to the "paralyzing impact 
of self-deterrence".'" Limited nuclear options were the tactics 
of the strong, they argued, but in the mid- and late 1970s, the 
United States had been unable to maintain its upper end of the 
strategic balance. With the Soviet Union on the verge of 
strategic superiority, the material base for the Schlesinger 
Doctrine had evaporated. The only way out of this dilemma, 
they concluded, was to increase the US capabilities for all kinds 
of conventional and nuclear waifare, and to work out strategies 
for their use which would convince Moscow that aggression 
could never pay. This line of reasoning enjoyed considerable 
support within the military and national security establishments 
of both the Carter and Reagan Administrations. 184 Thus, the 
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revival of strategy in the late 1970s and early 1980s reflected a 
rather wide-spread conviction that, in the words of Ronald 
Reagan, the security of the United States was "based on being 
prepared to meet all threats".'" 
Needless to say, this was an extremely demanding proposition. 
In a way, it was reminiscent of the "symmetrical" containment 
strategies of the early I 950s and early I 960s, only that the call 
for symmetry now applied also to the nuclear-strategic area of 
competition. Furthermore, Reagan's rearmament programs were 
based on a totally different economic philosophy and, one might 
add, a totally different national economic capability. That aside, 
the I 950, 1961 and 198 I revisions of US basic national security 
policy had some very similar implications: They all resulted in 
ambitious R&D and procurement programs for the armed forces, 
in radical increases in the defense budget, and - as an aggregate 
effect of all this- a renewed quest for strategic superiority vis-a-
vis the Soviet Union. 
However, there were crucial qualitative differences between the 
superiority sought in these three cases. The 1950 rearmament 
program was a response to a number of perceived negative 
trends in the East-West relationship, but first of all to the loss 
of the US monopoly in nuclear weapons. Foreseeing that its 
"winning weapon" was a wasting asset as a general deterrent of 
Soviet aggression, the Truman Administration embarked on an 
ambitious double-track policy aimed at restoring US superiority 
in both conventional and strategic forces. Together, these efforts 
were meant to provide the United States with that "pre-
ponderance of power" which men like Paul Nitze and Dean 
Acheson believed was needed to deter, or, if necessary, cope 
with Soviet aggression at the local as well as strategic level. 186 
However, even if the Soviet nuclear test in September 1949 was 
a watermark in the Cold War, its short-term implications for the 
strategic balance were mostly symbolic in nature. What is so 
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remarkable about the 1950 reannament programs, therefore, is 
that they - in addition to being infused with anger over the 
"loss" of China and near-loss of Korea - were propelled 
basically by an anticipated rather than actual loss of strategic 
superiority. As late as in 1954-1955, the envisioned years of 
"maximum danger", America's privileged position remained 
basically intact. The United States was still in a position of 
"absolute superiority", in the sense that, in a general war, it 
would probably have been capable of completely destroying the 
Soviet Union without risking irreparable damage to its own 
society. After 1955, however, the successive deployment of 
Soviet strategic bombers and development of a Soviet ballistic 
missile capability made the US position much more precarious. 
The build-up initiated as part of the Kennedy Administration's 
shift to Flexible Response reflected this development. By then 
the strategic balance was clearly in transfonnation - not so 
dramatically as Kennedy had claimed during the 1960 presiden-
tial campaign, but parity was on its way as a dark expanding 
cloud on the horizon. To seek outright superiority would now be 
a futile exercise. In the age of ballistic missiles the best one 
could hope for was to preserve what Nixon would later call 
"strategic sufficiency" - that is, capabilities strong enough to 
decide, if not dictate, the outcome of any military conflict short 
of unrestricted nuclear war. To maintain this state of "essential 
superiority", the Kennedy Administration accelerated ongoing 
modernization programs, made a more detennined effort in the 
area of civil defense, and started upon the long journey toward 
increased flexibility in and control over nuclear operations. 
The build-up of the early 1980s was yet another story. More 
than anything, it was motivated by a sense of insecurity caused 
by the Soviet Union's tremendous gains in offensive strategic 
power during the 1970s. Whereas the Johnson and Nixon 
Administrations had gone a long way towards accepting the 
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notion of parity, or "essential equivalence", we must bear in 
mind that the actual strategic balance at the time was still 
clearly in favor of the United States (whether the edge was clear 
enough to have any practical military or political importance, is 
another matter). It was not until the deployment of MIRV able 
third-generation ICBMs, the Backfire bomber, and SS-20 in the 
mid- and late 1970s that the Soviet Union achieved true parity 
in offensive strategic forces. What distinguishes the Carter-
Reagan build-up from those of the Truman and Kennedy 
Administrations, therefore, is that it originated from a situation 
of lost superiority. As we have seen, none of the post-MAD 
administrations in the United States seriously believed in the 
possibility of denying the Soviets true parity in central strategic 
forces - the question was rather whether it would be possible to 
deny them "essential superiority". What happened instead was 
that the United States began to focus more on technologies that 
could help to assure an American edge in other but closely 
related areas, such as C' facilities, hardened-targets destruction, 
"stealth" aircraft, cruise missiles, and strategic defense systems. 
What these achievements added up to was not to reinstall the 
lost US lead in central strategic capabilities, but to strengthen 
the relative power of the United States in those areas that would 
be crucial for the outcome of any limited conventional or 
nuclear conflict, including protracted counterforce strikes on 
both sides. Thus, more than trying to retain a situation of 
absolute or essential superiority, the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations were looking for ways to regain what we might 
call superiority on the margin, or "marginal superiority". 
In sum, US nuclear policy in the Cold War was characterized by 
a continuous search for superiority. But since the long-term 
trends in actual strategic capabilities were moving mostly in 
favor of the Soviet Union - resulting in successive shifts in the 
overall strategic balance from clear US superiority via "essential 
equivalence" to true parity - this quest may well be seen as a 
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defensive undertaking: All in all, it was more a question of 
keeping what one already had, than of seeking new advantages. 
This leads us, finally, to the question of motives and reasons. 
Leaving out the specific bureaucratic, technological, economic, 
and political factors that were decisive for the choice of 
particular weapons systems, what factors can best explain the 
shifts and continuities in US nuclear policy during the Cold 
War? In particular, what general causes influenced the search, 
or searches, for strategic superiority? 
As I have argued elsewhere, it is extremely difficult to find 
historical support for any single-factor theory on the arms-race 
phenomenon. The only sound methodological approach to the 
problem is that a number of possible causal factors - tech-
nological, economic, political, military, etc.- must be considered 
in each particular case. 187 This is not to suggest that all factors 
may have been equally influential at all stages of a particular 
race. On the contrary, there is always a dynamic interplay 
between the factors involved which may change their relative 
importance and explanatory power quite substantially over time. 
The US quest for strategic superiority in the Cold War is a case 
in point. As this study has shown, the overall thrust of US 
nuclear policy- including acquisition and deployment decisions 
- was determined by a mix of dynamic factors. Aside from the 
general ideological and geopolitical conflict with the Soviet 
Union, and the unfavorable imbalance in conventional military 
forces in Europe as a particular aspect of that conflict, US 
nuclear policy in the Cold War was essentially a product offour 
sets of influences: 
The first was the technological momentum within the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems. No doubt, 
the confident belief in the possibility of a continuous US 
101 
strategic supenonty that characterized the pre-MAD period 
reflected what US policymakers knew about the actual balance 
of power at the time. In these years, the number of warheads in 
the US stockpile went up from 2 "Fat Man" plutonium bombs 
in 1945 to 29,000 nuclear and thermonuclear warheads of almost 
thirty different types in 1963. 188 By then, the strategic triad 
was fully in place, with first-generation ICBMs and SLBMs 
being deployed at high speed and their follow-up systems 
already at an advanced stage of development. The B-52 strategic 
bomber, which in 1958-59 had been completed with its G and 
H models, would remain the mainstay aircraft of the bomber leg 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s. No doubt, the tremendous 
increase in capabilities and options resulting from these tech-
nological developments played a constituting role for the nuclear 
policies of the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy Adminis-
trations. 
In contrast, the MAD period saw the end of the numerical 
growth in warheads and delivery systems. Thus, in 1967 the 
stockpile reached an all-time peak of 32,000 warheads, and the 
size of the ICBM and SLBM forces was fixed at respectively 
I ,054 and 656 missiles - numbers never to be exceeded during 
the Cold War. Whereas important qualitative improvements took 
place within each leg of the triad, such as deployment of the 
FB-111 bomber (with SRAMs), conversion of Polaris to 
Poseidon class submarines, and deployment of Minuteman III 
ICBMs, none of these shared the revolutionary character of the 
changes in the preceding decade. Since there was a tremendous 
growth in both quantitative and qualitative capabilities of the 
Soviet forces in the late 1960s and early 1970s, this combination 
of numerical stagnation and moderate technological improve-
ments on the US side help to explain why the nuclear policies 
of the Johnson and Nixon-Ford Administrations were focusing 
so much on arms race stability and measures that, with Soviet 
collaboration, could cement the mutual hostage relationship. 
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The late 1970s and 1980s marked a revival of technological 
dynamism. In the area of strategic offense, US capabilities were 
increased by the deployment of new weapons systems like the 
air-, sea, and ground-launched cruise missiles, the "stealth" 
aircraft, and MlRYed lCBMs and SLBMs. In addition, sig-
nificant improvements were made in re-entry vehicle technology 
and warhead production, which greatly enhanced both the 
accuracy of ballistic missiles and their capability to kill hardened 
targets. Combined with important advances in C3 and intel-
ligence capabilities, these technological breakthroughs 
represented at least a "marginal" revolution in US offensive 
strategic power. The doctrinal shift in favor of counterforce and 
protracted nuclear war-fighting options could hardly have taken 
place without these technological improvements. Likewise, 
aiming far beyond the current state of the art in a number of 
sophisticated technologies, Reagan's "Star Wars" program would 
probably have been unsalable on Capitol Hill had it not been for 
the significant advances that had been made in micro-elec-
tronics, high energy and pulsed power physics, and in related 
sciences, during the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
A second factor of direct importance to the making of US 
nuclear policy in the Cold War was economy. In short, whereas 
the technological momentum was crucial in defining what 
military-strategic possibilities were available at any particular 
time, how US policymakers tried to transform these possibilities 
into actual capabilities depended heavily on their perceptions of 
the state of the national economy, as well as on their general 
notions about budget balancing and the "optimum mix" between 
private and federal investments. Interestingly, the dramatic 
increase in nuclear capabilities that characterized the pre-MAD 
period was not based on a common set of economic preferences. 
What happened in the 1950s and early 1960s was rather that an 
intensive development of strategic nuclear forces appeared 
rational from a conservative as well as liberal-expansionist 
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economic viewpoint. Truman (post-Korea) and Kennedy were 
both willing to increase, at least temporarily, the level of federal 
spending for defense in order to maintain overall strategic 
superiority. Although their military build-ups were designed 
primarily with the aim of increasing US conventional 
capabilities, both ended up supporting a large increase in the 
funding of strategic weapons programs as well - in fact, the 
relative share that these programs had of the total defense effort 
reached an all-time high during the Kennedy Administration. In 
comparison, Eisenhower's position was very different. As Dulles 
once put it, what he wanted for the United States and its allies 
was "a maximum deterrent at bearable costs." 189 To be true, 
his years in office saw a steep increase in allocations for nuclear 
weapons, but it is important to note that, unlike the Truman and 
Kennedy buildups, this boom in funding for defense was not 
part of a general expansion of US military programs. Quite the 
opposite, the growth took place because investment in strategic 
weapons systems were thought of as a way to bring down the 
total level of military spending. 
The MAD years were characterized first by a diversion of 
military funds into the Vietnam War, and thereafter by an effort 
to check the growth which that involvement caused in defense 
spending. Both policies implied a Jess vigorous development of 
the strategic forces than might otherwise have been the case. To 
the fiscally conservative Nixon and Ford Administrations, the 
perceived necessity of reducing the defense budget probably 
served as an extra incentive for strategic arms control - the 
cheapest way, they hoped, of halting the negative trend in the 
strategic balance. 
Carter was the first fiscal conservative Democratic candidate to 
win the presidency since Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932 (that the 
latter soon emerged as an all-time big spender, is another story). 
One of Carter's applause lines in the 1976 presidential campaign 
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was that he would be "trimming away the fat" in the defense 
budget so that the USA could have a lean, supple and muscular . 
defense. 190 Even though his promise to reduce the total 
spending for defense by $5-7 billion was soon converted into a 
call for a 3% annual increase, his fiscal conservatism un-
doubtedly made him a very cautious spender. More than 
anything, he was against spending billions of dollars on strategic 
weapons systems that he considered to be either of questionable 
military value or so expensive that their deployment could not 
be justified regardless of their projected capabilities. As we have 
seen, Carter's search for the most cost-effective alternative was 
a major factor in his decision to cancel the prestigious B-1 
bomber program. Budgetary concerns also played a role in his 
decisions to close the production line for the Minuteman JCBMs, 
and to slow down both the MX and Trident programs. Thus, 
whereas Carter came out strongly in favor of modernizing the 
strategic forces, his economic philosophy - as well as the 
unexpected high inflation in 1977-78 - made him careful not to 
overload the federal budget in general and the defense budget in 
particular. All in all, more than influencing the content and 
direction of his nuclear policy, Carter's view on the economy 
played a decisive role for the size and pace of his strategic 
weapons modernization programs. 
The same can be said about Ronald Reagan, but with almost the 
opposite result: his economic philosophy made him support a 
dramatic increase in the defense budget. The Reagan military 
buildup no doubt was motivated by political and strategic 
concerns. However, his peculiar economic philosophy - nick-
named "Reaganomics" by friends, "trickle-down economics" by 
foes - played an important role as well. Exactly as tax re-
ductions for the rich were supposed to induce a growth in 
private spending that, due to an anticipated expansion of the 
overall economic base, would benefit the lower-income tax 
payers as well, so were the dramatic increases in defense 
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spending supposed to trigger growth and reduce unemployment 
in key industrial sectors that, eventually, would spark off growth 
in the national economy as a whole. In the words of one 
observer, Reagan was "the first military Keynesian"; a politician 
who tried "spending his way out of the recession" of the early 
1980s. 191 The reference to Keynes is, of course, less relevant 
for the Reagan Administration's economic policy in general, but 
it certainly hits the nail on the head as far as its defense 
programs are concerned. As Caspar Weinberger put it in his 
Fiscal Year 1983 Report to Congress, in which he asked for 
support to Pentagon's $1.7 trillion five year defense plan, "fears 
that the defense budget of this Administration will strain the 
American economy are unfounded. ( ... ] Defense spending, like 
other Federal spending, produces something which contributes 
to the people's welfare."'" 
As we all know, things did not work out exactly that way. In 
the early 1990s, when president Bush administered a substantial 
reduction in defense spending, part of the reason was the urgent 
necessity of stopping the enormous federal deficit caused by the 
military buildup of his predecessor.'" Although Bush, in 
deference to Reagan, justified the cuts as part of the "peace 
dividend" made available by the reduced Soviet threat, it was 
clear from the very beginning of his tenn that he favored a more 
traditional conservative economic policy. As he put it in his 
inaugural address, the United States had "more will than wallet" 
- an observation he honored by proposing a defense budget 
which contained only an inflation adjustment and no real 
growth. He also revised his predecessors 1990-1994 Five Year 
Defense Plan, scaling down the assumed annual increase in 
defense spending from 2% to 1-2% after inflation.'" This did 
not hurt the strategic forces programs in any disproportionate 
way, however. On the contrary, within the total reductions, 
funding for strategic forces were subjected to smaller cuts than 
those for general purpose and tactical nuclear forces. 195 
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In sum, economic considerations influenced US nuclear policy 
in various important ways: as part of the rationale for giving 
higher priority to nuclear than conventional forces (early 
Truman and Eisenhower); as justification for a buildup of all 
forces, including strategic ones (post-1950 Truman, Kennedy, 
and Reagan); and, alternatively, as an incentive for a less 
vigorous expansion of strategic capabilities (Johnson, Nixon, 
Ford, Carter, and Bush). It is noteworthy, however, that until the 
final disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, no US adminis-
tration ever used economic arguments for justifYing a net 
reduction in their strategic weapons programs. 
A third factor influencing the evolution of US nuclear policy in 
the Cold War was inter-service rivalry. The sources consulted 
for this study suggest that this particular bureaucratic factor may 
have been less important in the MAD and post-MAD periods 
than in the pre-MAD period (1945-63). After the mid 1960s, 
there is really no parallel to the way in which the fight between 
the services for operational assignments, R&D funds, 
procurement contracts, and deployment responsibilities were 
influencing US nuclear doctrine as well as AED policies in the 
Truman and Eisenhower years. Part of the explanation is that 
some of the incentives for such intra-service competition 
disappeared when the success of the Polaris program finally 
allowed the Navy to play an independent and increasingly 
important strategic role. Thus, from the early 1960s onwards, 
both the Navy and the Air Force were in favor of a general 
expansion and modernization of the strategic forces. Naturally, 
there were occasional resumptions of old rivalries also in this 
regard - the Navy's attempt at using the deadlock over the MX 
basing mode to propel its own Trident II program through 
Congress is but one example."' However, the general trend 
was that inter-service rivalry became a less important influence 
than the joint influence provided by the JCS and its assisting 
bodies. 
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Another, closely related reason for this development was that, 
in the late 1950s, SAC not only lost its monopoly on the 
strategic nuclear mission in war, but was also deprived of its 
supreme responsibility for preparing the target lists and 
operational plans for that mission. The establishment of the Joint 
Strategic Target Planning Staff in 1960 was an important 
instrument in this coordination effort, which gradually- through 
the National Strategic Target List and the SlOP - helped to 
integrate otherwise conflicting influences from the Navy and Air 
Force into US strategic war planning. All in all, it appears that 
the late 1950s and early 1960s represented a watershed after 
which the main impact of the military services on US nuclear 
policy was provided for by joint actions and pressures, rather 
than by independent initiatives at the rival services' expense. 
While impossible to prove, it is not unlikely that this develop-
ment played a crucial role in maintaining the high share that the 
strategic weapons programs held of the total defense effort, 
especially in R&D. 197 
A fourth major influence that had great impact on the evolution 
of US nuclear policy throughout this period was Soviet nuclear 
strategy and capabilities - or, rather, how these were perceived 
by US authorities. In the pre-MAD period, US decisionmakers 
were permanently worried about the growth in Soviet military 
capabilities, which they generally saw as hard evidence of 
aggressive intentions. Every new Soviet achievement in the 
strategic nuclear weapons field, from the first atomic test in the 
fall of 1949 to the Sputnik launch in October 1957, triggered a 
new wave of public and government concern that the Soviet 
Union was about to catch up with or surpass the United States 
in offensive strategic capabilities. 
The Soviet successes no doubt made it easier for successive US 
administrations to maintain the growth in US R&D and 
procurement programs. Less obvious, but equally important, 
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they also had crucial influence on US nuclear doctrine and 
nuclear weapons employment policies. Without the growing 
nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union, the Bravo mission 
would never had gained the preeminence it had in US nuclear 
war planning in the 1950s. Moreover, Soviet offensive strength 
was instrumental in shaping the "everything-at-once" makeup of 
the strategic war plans developed under the Atomic Blitz and 
Massive Retaliation strategies. In a similar vein, the shift to 
Flexible Response cannot be fully understood unless one takes 
into account how the growth in Soviet strategic power in the 
preceding years was perceived by Kennedy and his advisers. 
More than anything, it was the increased American vulnerability 
to Soviet nuclear aggression that convinced them that Massive 
Retaliation had to be replaced by a more credible strategy. 
In the pre-MAD period, US decisionmakers were primarily 
concerned with Soviet nuclear capabilities, less so with how the 
Soviets were likely to employ their weapons in case deterrence 
should break down. This was natural, one might say, since the 
dominant expectation was that the US superiority in nuclear 
weapons would ensure a swift and favorable outcome of any 
general war between the superpowers. However, the focus and 
concern of these decisionmakers changed dramatically during the 
next decades as the US lead in offensive strategic forces was 
diminishing and the Soviet Union obtained "essential 
equivalence". By the early 1970s, when that equivalence had 
been firmly established, it was evident that US decisionmakers 
were becoming increasingly preoccupied with what their 
opponents were thinking and planning in regard to the possible 
employment of Soviet nuclear forces in a limited or a general 
war with the West. 
This is not to say that capabilities were disregarded: they were 
not. For instance, it was the dramatic growth in Soviet strategic 
forces that had brought McNamara to the conclusion that 
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strategic defense was a lost case and that, for the future, the key 
to US security would be to cap the anns race in order to 
stabilize the mutual hostage situation. Likewise, the perception 
of an emerging Soviet edge in land-based ballistic missiles was 
an essential part of the equation that led the first Nixon 
Administration to sign the SALT I Treaty. However, both 
within and outside government influential voices were heard 
questioning the assumption that the Soviet leadership actually 
shared the dominant US perception that MAD made war 
unwinnable, and therefore utterly irrational as well. Instead, they 
argued, evidence suggested that the Soviet military was in fact 
preparing itself for fighting and winning wars with the West, 
regardless of whether any or both sides should decide to cross 
the nuclear threshold. 
It was precisely this perception of a professional Soviet interest 
in nuclear war-fighting options that helped to revive US nuclear 
strategy in the mid 1970s. Having reached a dead end some ten 
years earlier, as part of the general sanctification of MAD, US 
nuclear strategists and war planners once again started to think 
seriously about whether and how it would be possible for the 
United States to ensure a favorable outcome in military 
confrontations with the Soviet Union short of general war. This 
revival of nuclear strategy, started in spe under Schlesinger but 
rapidly brought to maturity during the Carter and Reagan 
Administrations, should therefore be seen primarily as an action-
reaction phenomenon. Not only was it triggered by what 
influential US decisionmakers believed was happening on the 
Soviet side. Equally important, US policymakers were hoping 
that this copycat approach to nuclear strategy would help to 
strengthen the US deterrent. According to their line of 
reasoning, the United States could check whatever aggressive 
ambitions the Soviets had by building superior capabilities in 
exactly those marginal areas that were likely to tip the balance 
in any local and/or limited nuclear war. This task, they thought, 
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could be fulfilled by taking full advantage of the US superior 
technology base, especially its significant leads in micro-
electronics, advanced materials, computer and sensor tech-
nologies. In accordance with this prescription, the 1980s were 
characterized by an immense US effort at developing the "smart 
weapons", C' and intelligence capabilities needed to persuade 
Soviet decisionmakers that whatever limited nuclear war 
scenarios they might be contemplating, they would find them-
selves with inferior forces and fewer options than the United 
States. in short, the countervailing strategy was intended to deter 
Soviet aggression both by copying Soviet nuclear strategy, and, 
at the same time, by outclassing those Soviet forces that were 
assigned for the possible implementation of that strategy. While 
they were still seriously concerned about the growth of Soviet 
capabilities in central strategic forces, it seems that in the post-
MAD period US decisionmakers became increasingly pre-
occupied with Soviet strategic concepts and Soviet post-deter-
rence scenarios. Apparently, their interpretation of what the 
Soviets were up to in this respect had a correspondingly 
increasing influence upon the making of US nuclear policy. 
On the basis of these conclusions about how technological 
developments, economic considerations, inter-service rivalry, 
and Soviet actions were influencing US nuclear policy in the 
Cold War, what can be said about the general character of that 
policy? 
One important characteristic was the gradual shift from an 
almost "autistic" to an increasingly reactive policy. In a sense, 
the Baruch Plan for international atomic energy control as well 
as the early US nuclear strategies (Atomic Blitz and Massive 
Retaliation) were all fundamentally insensitive to Soviet fears, 
strategies, and capabilities - it was as if US decisionmakers 
believed that their overwhelming superiority in nuclear strategic 
forces would enable them to dictate the rules of the game for 
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both nuclear disarmament and nuclear war. This "autistic" 
approach became more and more problematic as Soviet 
capabilities increased in the late I 950s and early 1960s. Flexible 
Response and Assured Destruction represented an important 
break in this respect: despite other differences, both acknow-
ledged that the credibility of US nuclear policy could only be 
maintained by giving increased attention to what was going on 
the other side. 
However, whereas the McNamara years saw an increasing US 
willingness to mold its nuclear policy in accordance with 
ongoing or anticipated changes in Soviet capabilities, there was 
no parallel growth of receptiveness in regard to Soviet doctrine 
and likely targeting philosophy. This was precisely what the 
Schlesinger Doctrine brought into the equation. Both Escalation 
Control and the Countervailing Strategy was characterized by an 
unprecedented willingness to register, analyze, and counter 
Soviet strategic options, operational plans, and war-fighting 
capabilities. The increased US emphasis on C' and counter-force 
capabilities provides further evidence of the same trend. A 
similar development can be registered in US arms control 
positions as well - from a rather narrow focus on arms control 
and political stability in the MAD years, toward the much more 
ambitious tasks of first strike and crisis stability under Carter, 
Reagan, and Bush. Whereas both Johnson's 1964 "freeze" 
proposal and Nixon-Ford's SALT I proposals reflected a 
growing US concern with Soviet offensive capabilities, the 
strategic arms control positions of their successors reflected a 
wider set of concerns as well as ambitions: fearing that the 
Soviet leadership was Jess inhibited in terms of surpassing the 
nuclear threshold, the Carter, Reagan, and Bush administrations 
saw arms control as an instrument by which they could promote 
changes in the Soviet strategic force posture that would decrease 
its suitability for the kinds of aggressive nuclear operations 
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which US decisionmakers thought the Soviets would be most 
likely to contemplate in a crisis. 
Another, and closely related, feature that emerges from this 
study is that, despite the generally comfortable military position 
of the United States, its nuclear policy was basically defensive 
in character. The defensiveness was displayed in three ways: 
First, premium was always put on deterrence -even when they 
searched for war-fighting capabilities, US decisionmakers were 
primarily looking for ways to keep their opponents from 
initiating hostilities that could escalate to a limited or general 
nuclear war. Secondly, when major changes were being made in 
US nuclear policy, it regularly turned out to be in response to 
real or anticipated changes in Soviet strategic capabilities, or in 
Soviet nuclear strategy - at least, this was how most of the 
changes were explained and justified by US officials. Thirdly, 
strategic defense always figured high in the total US military 
RDT &E' effort: the historical proportion average for the Cold 
War period was 16%. In comparison, "naval warfare" averaged 
14% of total RDT&E, "land warfare" 13%, "air warfare" 13%, 
and "strategic warfare" 43%. 198 While there were significant 
variations in these proportions over time, it is important to note 
that, in an historical perspective, the huge investments in this 
field during the Reagan years were far from unique. For 
instance, when Caspar Weinberger asked the Congress for a total 
of $2.05 billion to SOl-related R&D in FY 1985, he was careful 
to point out that during the 1950s the United States had spent 
more than $100 billion (in !984 dollars) on strategic 
defense.''" Although McNamara was right that, in terms of 
deterrence and stability, there are at least two sides to strategic 
defense, there is no evidence in available sources that the 
administrations that pushed hardest to increase US capabilities 
' ROT &E = Research, development. test and evaluation. 
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in this field - the Eisenhower and Reagan administrations - did 
so for other than defensive reasons. 
On the other hand, and this may sound as a paradox, the 
defensiveness of US nuclear policy went hand in hand with a 
continuous quest for strategic superiority. There is a very simple 
explanation for this puzzle: as long as a particular country's 
relative power is in decline, it might fight successfully to 
maintain its lead but still feel on the defensive. In brief terms, 
this was very much what was happening with the US-Soviet 
strategic balance during the Cold War. The United States was 
moving steadily downwards - sliding in successive steps from 
positions of 11absolute'' through "essential 11 to "marginal" 
superiority - but never abandoned its ambition to solidify or 
even improve the current balance. As Carter's Presidential 
Directive 18 on "US National Strategy" put it, to deter Soviet 
aggression and counterbalance adverse Soviet influence in 
Europe and other key areas, the United States would maintain 
an overall strategic balance between itself and the Soviet Union 
"at least as favorable as that that now exists. "200 
The way to maintain or improve the current strategic balance 
was always to draw on America's comparative advantages: her 
stronger economy and superior technological capabilities. Thus, 
a fourth general characteristic of US nuclear policy in the Cold 
War was the emphasis put on qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, improvements in the US strategic position vis-a-vis 
the Soviet Union. Evidence of this is found in the enormous 
investments that were made in R&D for nuclear weapons 
systems. In the Cold War years, the US Department of Defense 
spent an average 43% of its total research, development, test and 
evaluation sources on programs related to "Strategic Warfare". 
In comparison, the procurement proportion average for "Nuclear 
Forces" in the same period was only 15%.201 Thus, it appears 
that the US nuclear weapons buildup was an extremely research 
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intensive business, in which a disproportionate amount of the 
total procurement costs was spent at the drawing board and in 
the test laboratories. The search for qualitative gains was 
reflected in other ways as well. For instance, US arms control 
positions appear to have been more influenced by how US 
decisionmakers perceived the qualitative than the quantitative 
aspects of the strategic balance. From the very beginning of the 
US-Soviet strategic arms control talks, a pattern emerged which 
showed that the US was far more concerned to maintain its lead 
in cutting edge technologies- such as MIRV, cruise missiles, or 
"star wars"-related technologies - than to use any of these assets 
as bargaining chips to obtain additional quantitative cuts in 
oiTensive Soviet weaponry. In practical terms, this meant that 
US arms control negotiators were more inclined to make 
concessions on numbers than on technologies, while the opposite 
had been true of their Soviet counterparts (who at least were 
eager to restrict qualitative improvements in areas where they 
found it difficult to compete). 
The fall of the Soviet Union left the United States as the only 
superpower on the scene. Even in military terms it is now 
clearly in a much stronger position than any of its potential 
enemies. This means that, in the future, the defensive character 
of US nuclear policy may be less striking than in the past. On 
the other hand, there is no reason to believe that it will call off 
its successful search for strategic superiority: the importance of 
military power may be decreasing worldwide to the benefit of 
economic and various kinds of "soft" power, but not to an extent 
which would make strategic superiority an irrelevant asset for a 
country with global interests. As before, it is every reason to 
expect that the key to US superiority will be found in its unique 
combination of economic-industrial and technological 
capabilities. On the threshold to a new historical era, Pentagon 
officials particularly stressed the crucial importance of 
maintaining a superior technology base. Looking ahead, into the 
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post-Cold War world, an official Pentagon report concluded: 
"Future US military superiority and our capability to deter attack 
depends on our continued ability to identif'y and support military 
important technologies and quickly field technologically 
advanced weapon systems. Currently, no country is ahead of the 
United States in any overall area of technology."'" 
Indeed, despite continuous and exhaustive Soviet efforts at 
catching up the US lead, this statement could, with equal 
accuracy, have been issued by any US administration throughout 
the Cold War. That fact certainly helps to explain why the 
"delicate" strategic balance of the Cold War always remained 
favorable to the United States and its allies. 
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Appendix 1: US nuclear warheads and strategic weapon 
























Numbers and types 
2 Mk-1 ("Little Boy") 
50 Mk-3 ("FDI Man") 
I ,000 Mk-4 (lirst mass 
produced a-bomb) 
1,750 Mk-12, Mk-17 (first 
deliverable h-bomb) 
12,000 W38 (first ICBM 
warhead) 





































wHridcnt I SLBM 
'? W87/Mk-21 (improved B-IB bomber 
? 
counterforcc warhead) MX ICBM 
W87/Mk-5 (first SLBM Trident II SLBM 
countcrforce warhead) 
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Appendix II: US nuclear doctrines and targeting policies, 1945-















Bravo mission (Soviet "strategic" military 
forces); Delta mission (Soviet "strategic" 
industry); Romeo mission (Soviet tactical 
forces). 
Bravo, Delta, Romeo missions in the same 
order of priority. 
SIOP·62 (first SlOP, approved in December 
1960, and took effect in Januar)' 1961 ). 
"Optimum Mix" of Bravo, Delta, Romeo 
targets. Everything-at-once strategy: No 
reserves, options, or withholds. 
Flexible Response SIOP-63 (approved in early 1962, and took 
effect in August 1962). The "No cities" 
version of counterforce strafe!:,')'. Four "Major 
Attack Options" (MAOs), plus sub-options 
and withholds. 
Assured Destruction No substantial changes in the SlOP 
Escalation Control SIOP-5 (approved in late 1975, and taking 
effect in January 1976) this SlOP represented 
NSDM-242 the first major revision ofSIOP-63. Divided 
(January 1974) into Major, Selective, Limited, and.Rcgional 
nuclear options, as well as into four target 
categories: Soviet strategic forces, other 
military targets, Soviet leadership, and 
economic-industrial (Ell) targets. Established 


















Strategic Target Data Base (NSTDB) with 
25,000 targets. Within the Ell category main 
emphasis on "economic recovery targets" in 
order to ensure the "most favorable" postwar 
outcome to the US. 
SlOP-SF (approved in October 1980, and 
effective from October 198 I) put incrcasr:d 
emphasis on Soviet leadership (more than 
5,000 targets). NSTDB includes 50,000 
targets. 
SIOP-6 (effective from October 1983) 
introduced the notion of"protractcd nuclear 
war". Further increased emphasis on targeting 
Soviet leadership and so-called "relocatable" 
military targets (RTs), such as mobile nuclear 
missiles. The counter-recovery mission was 
eliminated, which by 1987 had led to a 
dramatic reduction in the NSTDB to 14,000 
targets. 
SIOP-6F (effective from October 1989) 
confirmed the emphasis on destruction of the 
Soviet leadership, i.a_ by introducing so-
"prompt counter-leadership" options. In 
addition, emphasis on Rts and other Soviet 
strategic forces. Introduced the notion of 
"adaptive target planning". 
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Appendix Ill: US strategic anns control policy and strategic 
defense initiatives, 1945-1992. 
Year Strategic arms control policy 
Pre-MAD 
1946 Baruch Plan for international 
atomic energy control 
Strategic defense initiatives 
1950 "Pinetree line" (continental air 
defense system} 
1952 "DEW line" (three-layer conti-
nental air defense system) 
1958 the Nike-Zeus, the US Army's 
surfacNo-air missile (SAM), 
chosen for the integrated national 
anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
program 
1961 Joint US-Soviet statement calls 
for general and complete disarma-
ment in fully verifiable stages 
1963 
MAD 
the USA, the USSR, and the UK 
sign the Limited Test Ban Treaty 
1964 Johnson proposes a freeze in all 
existing US-Soviet strategic forces 
1967 Johnson proposes strategic arms 
control negotiations with the USSR 
1968 Johnson calls off planned SALT 
negotiations after Soviet invasion 
of Czechoslovakia 
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the Nike-Zeus program cancelled 
in favor of Nike-X 
US decision to produce and 
deploy the Sentinel, an upgraded 
version of Nike-X, for defense 
against Soviet counterforce and 
Chinese countervalue attack 
Year 
1974 
Strategic arms control policy 
Vladivostok Agreement signed 
by Ford and Brezhnev 
Post-MAD 
1969 Nixon signals US willingness to 
start SALT negotiations 
1972 ABM Treaty & SALT I "Interim" 
Treaty signed by Nixon and Brezhnev 
1977 Carter's "Deep Cuts" proposal 
1979 SALT 2 Treaty signed by Carter and 
Brezhnev 
1980 Carter asks Congress to postpone 
ratification of the SALT 2 Treaty 
1982 Reagan proposes START negotiations 
aimed at deep cuts in strategic 
missile warheads and throw-weights 
Strategic defense initiatives 
US cancels deployment of the 
single Safeguard system it is 
allowed under the ABM Treaty 
Sentinel becomes Sqfeguard 
(ABM system against Soviet 
countcrforce attack only) 
1983 Reagan presents his Strategic 
Defense Initiative (SDI) 
1986 Reagan and Gorbachev close to agree 
on a I 00% reduction in ICBMs and 
SLBMs within a period of ten years 
1991 START I Treaty signed by Bush and 
Gorbachev 
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